High rise buildings - firefighting arrangements: report

Appendix C

Recommendations for FRSs extracted from GTI Phase 1 Report Chapter 33

FRS: knowledge and understanding of materials used in high-rise buildings

Para 33.10b all FRSs ensure that their personnel at all levels understand the risk of fire taking hold in the external walls of high-rise buildings and know how to recognise it when it occurs.

Section 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004^[22]

Para 33. 11a LFB^[23] review, and revise as appropriate, Appendix 1 to PN633^[24] to ensure that it fully reflects the principles in GRA 3.2^[25]

b. LFB ensure that all officers of the rank of Crew Manager and above are trained in carrying out the requirements of PN633 relating to the inspection of high-rise buildings.

Plans

Para 33.12. insofar as it is not already the case, that all FRSs be equipped to receive and store electronic plans and to make them available to incident commanders and control room managers.

Communication between the control room and the incident commander

Para 33.14a LFB review its policies on communications between the control room and the incident commander;

b. all officers who may be expected to act as incident commanders (i.e. all those above the rank of Crew Manager) receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the control room;

c. all CROs of Assistant Operations Manager rank and above receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the incident commander;

d. a dedicated communication link be provided between the senior officer in the control room and the incident commander

Emergency calls

Para 33.15a the LFB's policies be amended to draw a clearer distinction between callers seeking advice and callers who believe they are trapped and need rescuing

b. the LFB provide regular and more effective refresher training to CROs at all levels, including supervisors;

c. all fire and rescue services develop policies for handling a large number of FSG calls simultaneously

d. electronic systems be developed to record FSG information in the control room and display it simultaneously at the bridgehead and in any command units

e. policies be developed for managing a transition from "stay put" to "get out".

f. control room staff receive training directed specifically to handling such a change of advice and conveying it effectively to callers

Para 33.16 steps be taken to investigate methods by which assisting control rooms can obtain access to the information available to the host control room.

Para 33.17 the LAS and the MPS review their protocols and policies to ensure that their operators can identify FSG calls (as defined by the LFB) and pass them to the LFB as soon as possible.

Command and control

Para 33.18a the LFB develop policies and training to ensure better control of deployments and the use of resources

b. the LFB develop policies and training to ensure that better information is obtained from crews returning from deployments and that the information is recorded in a form that enables it to be made available immediately to the incident commander (and thereafter to the command units and the control room)

Para 19 the LFB develop a communication system to enable direct communication between the control room and the incident commander and improve the means of communication between the incident commander and the bridgehead.

Para 20. the LFB investigate the use of modern communication techniques to provide a direct line of communication between the control room and the bridgehead, allowing information to be transmitted directly between the control room and the bridgehead and providing an integrated system of recording FSG information and the results of deployments

Para 33.18a the LFB develop policies and training to ensure better control of deployments and the use of resources

b. the LFB develop policies and training to ensure that better information is obtained from crews returning from deployments and that the information is recorded in a form that enables it to be made available immediately to the incident commander (and thereafter to the command units and the control room)

Para 19 the LFB develop a communication system to enable direct communication between the control room and the incident commander and improve the means of communication between the incident commander and the bridgehead.

Para 20. the LFB investigate the use of modern communication techniques to provide a direct line of communication between the control room and the bridgehead, allowing information to be transmitted directly between the control room and the bridgehead and providing an integrated system of recording FSG information and the results of deployments

Equipment

Para 33.21a the LFB urgently take steps to obtain equipment that enables firefighters wearing helmets and breathing apparatus to communicate with the bridgehead effectively, including when operating in high-rise buildings

b. urgent steps be taken to ensure that the command support system is fully operative on all command units and that crews are trained in its use.

Evacuation

Para 33.22b fire and rescue services develop policies for partial and total evacuation of high-rise residential buildings and training to support them;

g. all fire and rescue services be equipped with smoke hoods to assist in the evacuation of occupants through smoke-filled exit routes

Co-operation between emergency services

Para 33.31 the Joint Doctrine be amended to make it clear:

a. that each emergency service must communicate the declaration of a Major Incident to all other Category 1 Responders as soon as possible;

b. that on the declaration of a Major Incident clear lines of communication must be established as soon as possible between the control rooms of the individual emergency services;

c. that a single point of contact should be designated within each control room to facilitate such communication;

d. that a "METHANE" message should be sent as soon as possible by the emergency service declaring a Major Incident.

Para 33.32 steps be taken to investigate the compatibility of the LFB systems with those of the MPS and the LAS with a view to enabling all three emergency services' systems to read each other's messages

Para 33.33 steps be taken to ensure that the airborne datalink system on every NPAS helicopter observing an incident which involves one of the other emergency services defaults to the National Emergency Service user encryption.

Para 33.34 the LFB, the MPS, the LAS and the London local authorities all investigate ways of improving the collection of information about survivors and making it available more rapidly to those wishing to make contact with them.