Economic Impact of a Minimum Income Guarantee: Analysis of economic theory and policy evidence
Economic Impact of a Minimum Income Guarantee: Analysis of economic theory and policy evidence by WPI Economics on behalf of the independent Minimum Income Guarantee Expert Group.
Applying economic theory to the Scottish Government’s current Minimum Income Guarantee policy design
The previous chapter provided an overview assessment of some of the potential impacts we would expect to see from economic theory following the introduction of a Minimum Income Guarantee.
In this chapter, we bring together the findings from the economic theory to develop a Theory of Change (Figure 1) that can be applied to understand the potential impacts of a Minimum Income Guarantee in Scotland.
The “Inputs” into the Theory of Change model reflect the market and policy ‘failures’ that a Minimum Income Guarantee is seeking to address, which we outlined in further detail in the previous chapter.
The introduction of a Minimum Income Guarantee as the “Intervention” to address these “Inputs” will combine social security reform, changes to the world of work and tackling the cost and access to essential services.
However, the exact policy design of the Minimum Income Guarantee in terms of targeting and the composition and interaction of the various levers seeking to achieve the Minimum Income Guarantee will determine the exact nature and scale of the impacts. To demonstrate this, we have constructed a Theory of Change that presents one scenario for how the Minimum Income Guarantee could be implemented based upon the current internal thinking of the Minimum Income Guarantee Expert Group. As such, we have made the following assumptions, which are based on the long-term ambition of the Minimum Income Guarantee outlined in the report’s introduction:
Reform to the social security system will impact both the functionality and generosity of welfare payments. While means-testing will remain, the conditionality regime will be loosening with no sanctions and potentially a time-limited conditionality applied to those who are able to work. Payments will be at the individual level, and take-up will be automated if possible. This is captured in our “policy mechanism”, and the impacts are reflected in the “effects” and “demographic effects”.
Major reform in the functioning of Scotland’s economic model and labour market would enable a majority of people to reach the Minimum Income Guarantee through work. This would require a model that brings together employers, employees, and government to establish a social partnership approach to economic development. Overall, we expect the economy would benefit from sectoral agreements, higher minimum wages, minimum hours, skills investment, and a shift away from ‘low-quality work’. This is captured in our “policy mechanism”, and the impacts are reflected in the “effects” and “demographic effects”.
Supporting the increase in incomes through work and social security would be a focus on reducing the cost of essential services – particularly those that enable workplace access such as childcare and transport. It is expected that these services will be free at the point of use, or at least highly subsidised, and would move towards a universal approach modelled on other public services. This is captured in our “policy mechanism” and the impacts are reflected in the “effects” and “demographic effects”.
The “outcomes” within the Theory of Change are those that we are likely to expect from the introduction of a Minimum Income Guarantee. The Theory of Change we outline is just one scenario to help understand the interconnectedness of policy choices and impacts on these outcomes. The shape of the outcomes we expect to see will look different depending on the exact policy design of a Minimum Income Guarantee, and how the various levers interact with each other.
F igure 1: Theory of Change for the introduction of a Minimum Income Guarantee
Inputs: market and policy failures to address |
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Stubbornly high poverty rates |
Labour market inefficiencies and barriers |
Inadequate financial support via the social security system |
Failure to maximise work incentives |
Rising cost of essential household goods & services |
Intervention: Introduce a Minimum Income Guarantee |
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Social Security reform |
Labour market and work |
Essential services and household costs |
Policy mechanism |
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A simplified and more generous safety net More predictable income with changes to conditionality regime |
Social partnership approach to economy bringing together employers, workers and government Reduction in precarious employment and 'low quality' work |
Improved access to essential services, in particular transport and childcare Increased government spending to provide free / subsidised services |
Effects |
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Change in reservation wage (the minimum rate of pay at which individuals are willing to take a job) Longer job searches, but with potentially better long-term job matching Change in labour supply Increased risk-taking and entrepreneurship |
Improved incentive to work as employers pressured to increase wages Improved job retention, job fulfilment and less labour market decoupling Change in hours worked and wages earned |
Reduction in household costs Improved ability to participate in the labour market Improved ability to participate in the economy Improved child development and opportunities |
Demographic effects |
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Work incentives potentially weakened for young people, women (second earners) and households without children Lone parents and single households likely to be incentivised most |
Gendered impact on labour market participation Potential for lower overall employment with ‘good work’ focus – but more workers in high-skilled roles |
Increased labour market involvement of parents with young children – particularly women Better ability of rural and other isolated population to access the labour market |
Outputs |
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Reduction in poverty |
Change in labour supply, work incentives and labour market composition |
Higher and more certain incomes for low-income households |
Increased consumption (poorer households have a higher propensity to consume) |
Better health and wellbeing |
To further understand the scale and certainty of the impacts of different policy levers and how these may need to be offset, we have put together a RAG rating table (Table 3) to outline how each policy lever on its own terms impacts upon the outcomes presented in the Theory of Change. In addition, we also assess the expected household impacts in terms of targeting and the upfront fiscal cost of each policy level.
The scoring of the RAG rating system is based on the following criteria, as well as being accompanied by a brief explanatory note.
Green: Overall likely positive impact on meeting the outcomes on its own terms.
Amber: Likely – but uncertain – to have a positive impact unless supported by another lever.
Red: Likely negative outcomes that need to be offset by another lever.
Reduced poverty |
Labour market participation and work incentive |
Higher and more certain incomes |
Improvements to health and wellbeing |
Increased consumption |
Household impacts |
Fiscal cost |
|
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Improved social security |
Green: Increased income will reduce poverty, especially deep poverty. |
Red: Limited conditionality may act as a disincentive to work, especially for certain groups. |
Green: Social security payments will increase in value, and limited conditionality increases certainty. |
Green: Reduced stress from navigated complex system. |
Green: Increased income amongst low-income households will boost consumption. |
Amber: Universally applied to all individuals/families, with some uncertainty on the benefits for all of these. |
Red: Significant upfront cost of increasing social security spending to the Minimum Income Guarantee level. |
Minimum Income Guarantee ‘top up’ |
Green: Targeted at ensuring certain groups meet the Minimum Income Guarantee level. |
Red: Distinctive on seeking work for those groups who may benefit from the ‘top up’. |
Amber: ‘Top up’ payment could be withdrawn if other income increases. |
Amber: Likely to improve wellbeing for groups with poor health outcomes (e.g. carers, disabled people). |
Green: Increased income amongst low-income households will boost consumption. |
Green: Well-targeted at household groups who would fall below the Minimum Income Guarantee level. |
Amber: Additional cost on top of social security reform, but more targeted. |
Reduced household costs/increased access to essential services |
Amber: Reduced household costs, but full poverty impact dependent upon income levels. |
Green: Improved access to transport and childcare will especially increase labour market participation of currently excluded groups. |
Amber: Higher incomes as less cost-based spending, but not specifically targeted at income side. |
Green: Improved health from a better connection to work provided by increased service access. |
Amber: Higher incomes from less cost-based spending make this likely, but not certain. |
Green: Well targeted at women (childcare) and those in rural areas (transport). |
Red: Significant cost to government via subsidy or free provision. |
Labour market and work reforms |
Amber: Likely an increase in wages will reduce poverty, but it requires improved fairness in labour market access. |
Green: Significant boost to labour market participation. |
Amber: Dependent upon employers taking a ‘Good Work’ approach across a number of sectors. |
Amber: Dependent upon the type of work and workplace health policies in place to keep people better connected to workplace. |
Green: Increased income amongst low-income households will boost consumption. |
Amber: Dependent upon policy design and employer response to how well targeted this is at excluded groups. |
Green: Limited fiscal cost. Most cost will fall on business in higher wages. |
Below, we provide further detail on the assumptions underpinning our RAG ratings for each of the expected outcomes.
Improving social security: More generous social security payments, with limited conditionality, will have positive impacts on poverty reduction and, through this, increased consumption and financial certainty of low-income households. However, we expect this will have a significant fiscal cost (paid via increased taxation) and loosening conditionality will act as a disincentive to labour market participation.
A Minimum Income Guarantee ‘top up’: The Minimum Income Guarantee ‘top up’ would be effectively targeted at groups/demographics who fall short of the Minimum Income Guarantee through other levers, and through this ‘top up’ would ensure these groups reach the adequate level. However, there is a concern that knowledge of this payment may act as a disincentive to these groups’ labour market participation. The exact design of how the ‘top up’ is administered and assessed will determine the certainty of this income.
Reducing cost and improving essential services: The services that are focused on in our assumptions are childcare and transport, as these are two of the services that will have the most impact on supporting labour market access. While reducing the costs of these services will have, in theory, a universal benefit, they will have a targeted impact on important groups who are currently facing high costs that act as a barrier to economic participation, for example, women and those living in more rural areas. While improving access to services through cost reduction will increase incomes by decreasing the spending of individuals on these services, it is important that cost-based reforms are coupled with policy reform that is focused on improving the adequacy and stability of incomes. The major challenge is the fiscal cost of reduction of essential costs – both subsidising or universalising will require significant investment from government.
Labour market and work reforms: Improved labour market access will necessarily come with improved work incentives and a positive impact on consumption. The major uncertainties on the other outcomes (represented by Amber) will be determined by whether this labour market access takes the form of, on the whole, ‘good work’ and how well this improved work access is supported by improved services / reduced costs. This would make the overall costs of a Minimum Income Guarantee lower (as greater numbers reach the Minimum Income Guarantee through work) and also counters some of the potentially negative labour market implications of social security reform.
Ultimately, any one lever is unlikely to meet all of the outcomes on its own, and the RAG-rating assessment highlights the importance of ensuring that a more generous social security offering is underpinned by robust work incentives and labour market improvements and targeted by sustained action on important household costs and services.
Contact
Email: MIGsecretariat@gov.scot
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