Internal migration in Scotland and the UK: trends and policy lessons

1. Introduction

Migration has been instrumental in forming the Scottish nation as it is today. All of those living in Scotland are either direct migrants or the children of migrants who came here sometime after the Ice Age. Migration will continue to mould Scottish society in the future. Last century was dominated by net emigration – more people leaving Scotland than arriving, and much of this migration comprised moves to and from other parts of the UK. But so far this century, more people have moved to Scotland than have left. Since the beginning of the century, about 80 - 100,000 individuals have arrived in Scotland annually, whereas 60 - 80,000 people have left. The country has experienced an average net migration of 20,000 individuals annually over the last two decades. Migration between Scotland and the rest of the UK accounts for two-fifths of the country’s positive net migration. Within Scotland, there were significant movements of population from the north and east to the west during the 18^th and 19^th centuries, mostly driven by the Industrial Revolution. In the latter part of the 20^th century and in recent years, movement has instead been from west to east, with economic change again being an important driver.

In a previous report (EAG 2019a), we discussed international migration – movements between Scotland and the EU or between Scotland and other parts of the world. This report considers shorter distance moves – between Scotland and the rest of the UK (rUK) or moves within Scotland. There are no legal barriers to such flows, such as visa or work permit requirements. For migration within the UK and within Scotland, the barriers to movement are not so much legal, but comprise a mixture of psychological, social and economic factors. If liberal democracies wish to influence internal flows, they can only do so by offering incentives, such as higher salaries or access to subsidised housing. We discuss the efficacy of such policies later in the report.

Internal migration has an important role in shaping an area’s population structure. As migrants tend to be relatively young, migration flows typically increase the average age at the origin and reduce it at the destination region. Thus we find that Scotland’s four major cities, Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh and Glasgow, which are favourite destinations for migrants, have younger populations than any of Scotland’s other local authorities. In contrast, the average age of those living in Dumfries and Galloway, Argyll and Bute and Na h-Eileanan Siar, areas from which young people often migrate, is more than six years greater than residents of Edinburgh. Migration also affects the overall population level. Since 1981, the populations of Aberdeenshire, East and West Lothian, Perth & Kinross and Highland have all increased by more than 20 per cent, while that of Inverclyde has fallen by more than 20 percent. These changes are driven principally by net migration rather than by the “natural change” – the difference between births and deaths.

Internal migration also has important impacts on productivity, economic growth, and public services. As most migration is either for study or work, internal flows tend to increase the productive capacity at the destination, while reducing it at the origin. Migration also increases demand for public services at the destination, while reducing it at the origin. Such changes can have profound effects on communities: rural communities may find it impossible to sustain public services once population drops below a critical level. But the reverse can happen in cases where rapid immigration creates pressure on services such as school education and health.

If the UK government succeeds in reducing international migration flows to the UK, Scotland’s population will become more reliant on internal migration for any growth. The “natural change” – births less deaths – in Scotland’s population has been virtually zero over the past two decades (it averaged only 490 persons over the period 2004-2018). Since 2015, it has become negative. The Registrar General’s population projection suggests that deaths will exceed births by an average of 10,000 between 2020 and 2030. Thus Scotland’s population can only grow if there is significant net in-migration. Further, without migration inflows from the rUK, Scotland’s population is projected to age even faster and eventually decline (EAG 2019a).

1.1 Defining and Explaining Internal Migration

Migration is usually understood to involve a change of location and of social circumstances, whether on a short-term basis (3-12 months) or for the long-term (more than twelve months).^[1] For workers, migration often entails a change of employment, though this is not always the case: intra-firm transfers can also involve change of location. International migrants require permission from the government at their chosen destination to be allowed to migrate. But for internal migration, no such permission is required and the effects of a change of residence on social and economic circumstances are less clear. This is because internal migration is invariably measured by counting the number of people who are deemed to have crossed some administrative boundary within a country.

Crossing administrative boundaries does not always indicate a significant change of circumstances. Many short distance moves are associated with changes in housing conditions, while longer distance moves are more likely to involve both a change in housing and of some other circumstance such as employment or education. We explore these questions in Chapter 2 when we consider how migration flows are classified and measured in Scotland.

There is a range of theories in social science seeking to explain migration. Within economics, the best known is human capital theory (or neoclassical economics) and is particularly associated with Becker (1962) and Sjastaad (1962). It is based on an individualistic decision-making approach in which potential migrants decide to locate at the destination that offers the best alternative to their current location. Individuals are rational agents and their decisions on the “best alternative” take account of current and future, market and non-market, costs and benefits. Since prospects are not certain, these costs and benefits are also be adjusted by the willingness of the individuals to take risks. More risk-averse individuals are less likely to migrate.

The human capital model is based on certain assumptions about individualistic, rational behaviour, that many have argued fail to capture the complexity of social behaviour. Thus many social scientists have adjusted such theories to capture insights from other disciplines (Boswell 2008). For example, the ‘new economics of migration’ tends to view decision-making from the perspective of households, which make collective decisions in order to spread risk across members. This approach emphasises how migration decisions are embedded in a range of decisions across an individual’s lifecourse, including educational and occupational choice, partnership and childbearing, and retirement (Kulu and Milewski 2007). Both approaches help explain why migrants tend to be young, as they have longer to realise the benefits of migration and may move to enhance their qualifications and/or future earnings.

Other theorists have incorporated the role of migrant networks, which serve to offset the costs of migration through providing information and resources to reduce risk and assist in integration in places of destination (Haug 2008). Theories of ‘cultures of migration’ (Kandel and Massey 2002) show how particular places of origin may normalise migration as an expected and desirable way of enhancing life chances, just as neighbouring areas with similar socio-economic conditions sustain a more sedentary culture that discourages emigration. Systems theories, meanwhile, explore structural relations between places of origin and destination (such as shared language, culture, trade, or historical ties) to explain why people from certain places of origin often migrate to the same destinations (for an overview, see Bakewell 2014).

Importantly, all of these approaches show that migration is not the norm: given the risks associated with mobility, most people prefer to remain in their place of origin. Such risks are expected to increase where the move involves a greater distance, implying higher costs and logistical challenges in moving, as well as separation from family and friendship networks. Other risks may be linked to differences in socio-cultural conditions (for example, a different language, schooling system, or housing market). Families may face particular challenges, for example in finding employment for both partners, and the disruption for children caused by changing school and social networks. Some of these challenges can be offset through migrant networks, which can help smooth transitions. Public authorities in areas of destination can also play an important role, providing assurances that a decision to migrate will not result in significant disruption or unexpected negative outcomes.

For potential migrants, another consideration is whether the move is expected to be temporary or permanent. Households or individuals may seek to reduce upheaval or uncertainty through a temporary move (potentially transitioning to a longer-term one); or by repeated short-term moves, also known as pendular or seasonal migration. Such patterns of temporary migration were common in Scotland prior to the Second World War (Anderson 2018), often associated with agriculture, fishing, tourism and construction. More recently, seasonal variations in demand in these sectors has been met by international migration, particularly from Eastern Europe. But the underlying motive remains one of moving to take advantage of higher incomes that are available at the destination compared with the origin, while retaining a permanent (family) base in the place of origin.

Migration clearly has a number of significant impacts on both places of origin and destination. Given that migrants tend to be younger than the average population and that mobility tends to be driven by a desire to improve life chances, they typically make a positive contribution to productivity and economic growth in places of destination – indeed, migration is frequently associated with problems of ‘brain drain’ from places of origin. However, substantial in-migration may also place pressures on public services in places of destination – while potentially leading to under-use and even closure of services in places of origin. In terms of housing markets, regions of origin will tend to see house prices and rentals fall, while the opposite is true in destination regions. And if the supply of housing at the destination region fails to adjust, perhaps due to planning regulations or some other restriction on supply, the increasing cost of housing may deter migrants who feel that the benefits of movement are outweighed by the additional costs of accommodation. If such costs deter workers from moving to the jobs where their productivity is likely to be greatest, there is an overall cost to the economy: aggregate income and tax receipts will be lower than they would otherwise be. Note that taxes such as Land and Building Transactions Tax (LBTT) increase the costs of migration for owner occupiers and may therefore also have an adverse effect on migration flows and hence on productivity.

For those wishing to change job, but for whom the cost of migration is high, there may be another option. They may choose to commute rather than migrate if commuting is a feasible option. While improved transport links may aid commuting, they are almost certain to have negative environmental consequences. Again, this has implications for policy. Commuting will be more attractive when the price of transport is low and the cost of housing is high. Policy interventions can change these relative costs. Thus, for example, the imposition of “green belt” planning regulations may result in increased carbon emissions by inflating house prices, tilting the balance in favour of commuting over migration. In contrast, increased fuel duties and/or public transport costs tilt the balance in favour of migration rather than commuting.

High housing costs and falling transport costs cause labour markets to increase in size as workers opt to travel greater distances to find employment. Travel to work areas (TTWAs) are defined by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) to approximate labour market areas within which at least 75% of residents both live and work. In 1991 there were 308 TTWAs covering the UK; in 2001 there were 243; and in 2011 there were 228, of which 45 were in Scotland (ONS 2016). Labour markets have thus been increasing in size. This implies longer commutes and fewer house moves.