Phase 3 Assessment of risk
- The risk to the UK will vary widely according to circumstances, which will need to be taken into account during this phase
- A single, or even several sporadic, human case(s) of infection due to a novel virus (e.g. an avian influenza virus) outside the UK still represents a very small risk to the UK, especially if associated with an identified source (e.g. contact with sick poultry). Closer vigilance will be required if cases are associated with significant ongoing outbreaks of avian influenza in poultry, particularly if geographically close to the UK
- The risk of mutation or re-assortment to produce a virus more adapted to humans will need to be taken into account, but may be impossible to predict
- A single human case of influenza due to an avian or other novel virus within the UK requires full investigation, appropriate containment measures and a risk assessment
Priorities
- Maintain close liaison with international organisations such as WHO and OIE
- Assist with identification of the virus and its characteristics
- Assess pandemic preparedness and identify and implement actions needed to fill gaps/weaknesses
- Take action to improve personal and respiratory hygiene
- Develop communications strategy and prepare materials for all future phases
Main capabilities required
- Diagnostic capability for the new virus
- To recognise illness potentially due to a new strain in people in the UK, confirm it virologically and investigate the possible source
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Scottish Government working in a UK Government framework |
- Monitor and review pandemic risk assessment
- Convene SECC(Flu) to address policy/preparedness issues in Scotland
- Review/test communication links and preparedness /coordination arrangements
- Brief and convene Cabinet Sub-Committee on Civil Contingencies ( SEER- CSC) if required
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SGHD in collaboration with DH |
- Inform Justice Directorates and NHS Scotland of change of phase and UK significance
- Liaise with Environment Directorates and relevant Scottish Government directorates over wider implications. Issue information/advice to travellers, public and health professionals in Scotland
- Provide information/briefings.
- With DfID, HPA and HPS, consider need and options for Scotland to support WHO/international response
- Review options and development plans for a potential pandemic (or pre-pandemic) vaccine with NIBSC and manufacturers ( DH lead)
- Refine intervention strategies for Phases 4, 5 and 6. Review pharmaceutical and other supply needs in Scotland
- Review operational guidance for NHS Scotland, community services and others
- Begin to prepare the public for the possibility of an influenza pandemic
- Prepare information materials for future phases
- Launch online communications
- Review preparedness plans for future phases
- If within Scotland, confirm with HPS, HPA , DH and report to WHO and EU (via EWRS)
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Scottish Government directorates |
- Work with key stakeholders to review pandemic preparedness
- FCO: issue information/advice to travellers/ UK nationals abroad in consultation with DH and SGHD
- DfID: consider need for assistance abroad
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Health Protection Scotland |
- Monitor international situation and advise SGHD on Scottish health risk
- Liaise with virology labs providing serological investigations as required
- Provide guidance on management of suspected UK cases and contacts, support NHS response, maintain database and review/revise/test pandemic plans
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NHS and Community Care |
- Ensure arrangements in place to identify, investigate, report and manage any suspected case of infection with a novel virus
- Review/revise/test pandemic plans
- Maintain diagnostic capability and provide serological investigations as required
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Phase 4 Assessment of risk
- Small clusters in people outside the UK are still likely to present only a small risk to the UK; the risk increases if there are many cases, there is no identifiable epidemiological link between clusters, there are strong travel links to the UK or cases are in a geographically close country
- Risk of further cases increases if they are associated with widespread, ongoing avian outbreaks, especially if control measures late or inadequate
- The longer such outbreaks continue, the greater the concern
Priorities
- Assist with identification of the virus and its characteristics
- Assist international investigation
- If associated with avian/animal influenza, close liaison with animal health colleagues
- Review pandemic plans, including business continuity arrangements
- Review effectiveness of antiviral medicines
- Assess potential candidate vaccine strains
Main capabilities required
- If in the UK: ability to identify epidemiologically linked human cases of influenza which might indicate person-to-person spread
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Scottish Government working in a UK Government framework |
- Review risk assessment, informed by Health Directorates
- Continue to review and refine policies and pandemic management arrangements at official and Ministerial levels, including business continuity plans
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SGHD in collaboration with DH |
- Notify Justice Directorates and NHS Scotland of change in Phases
- Advise on Scottish public health risk and ensure rapid reassessment if circumstances change
- Liaise with Environment Directorates over implications for farming/poultry industry
- Provide information /advice to Scottish travellers and residents abroad in conjunction with FCO
- Advise health professionals on identification, management and reporting of any UK case
- Update and distribute public information more widely
- Review plans for storage, distribution and access to antiviral medicines in Scotland
- Liaise with NIBSC and vaccine manufacturers ( DH lead)
- Ensure NHS operational plans are in place. Review patient management protocols. Reports to WHO and the EU
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Scottish Government directorates |
- Work with key stakeholders to support preparedness planning in Scotland
- FCO: issue information/advice to travellers/ UK nationals abroad, in consultation with DH and SGHD
- DfID: consider need for assistance abroad
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Health Protection Scotland |
- Closely monitor international situation - including emerging epidemiological and treatment outcome data and advise SGHD on risk to UK public health
- Produce update reports as agreed with SGHD
- Liaise with SGHD over advice to travellers and link with HPA and Scottish Government communications offices
- Liaise with NHS laboratories
- Heighten surveillance for imported cases/clusters of infection, particularly in communities with travel contact with sites of confirmed infection clusters
- Amend algorithms for managing suspected/confirmed cases, including for use at ports
- Support local NHS investigation and management of incidents/clusters
- Work with WHO to enhance surveillance, fully investigate, develop case definitions and consider seroprevalence studies if origin in the UK
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NHS and Community Care |
- Ensure arrangements in place to identify, investigate and manage cases/clusters following HPS guidance
- Refine pandemic response plans
- Continue to test plans for phases 5 and 6, in conjunction with local stakeholders
- Maintain diagnostic capability and capacity for new strain, including antiviral susceptibility testing
- Fully characterise any viruses from Scottish cases and maintain database
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Phase 5 Assessment of risk
- Risk to UK significantly increased: plans must assume progression to Phase 6. If not, arrangements can be stood down/ maintained as precaution
Priorities
- Put all pandemic preparedness and operational response arrangements on standby for implementation
- Vaccine development
- Review of antiviral supply
- International coordination of actions
Main capabilities required
- To monitor clinical and virological spread, using emerging data to reassess planning assumptions (acknowledging that virus is still not a pandemic virus and may further evolve)
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Scottish Government working in a UK Government framework |
- Review risk assessment for Scotland and put in place cross-Government emergency management structures and procedures, with DH as lead Department, including cross-Government communications strategy and co-ordination
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SGHD in collaboration with DH |
- Notify change in Phase and implications for the Scotland
- Assess and advise on public health risk
- Initiate arrangements for regular close liaison with HPS
- Finalise health coordination and communications structure
- Activate Scottish Health Emergency Response Team
- Set up daily situation reporting to Cabinet Office
- Alert NIPC and convene as necessary (by most efficient means) to review available information and advise on the response
- Alert Scientific Advisory Group and convene as necessary to review and advise on emerging evidence
- Review vaccine availability and supply. Implement plans for any pre-pandemic vaccination
- With FCO issue information/advice for UK travellers and residents abroad. Issue information and advice to the health service, including any updates to operational plans
- Activate automated helpline
- Implement public communications strategy, including regular media briefings and a national pandemic leaflet door drop
- Finalise research proposals for implementation during a pandemic
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Scottish Government directorates |
- Activate business continuity plans, work with key stakeholders to support their response and maintain critical national infrastructure
- FCO: in consultation with DH and SGHD, issue information/advice to travellers/ UK nationals abroad, including arrangements for UK residents abroad
- DfID: consider need for assistance abroad
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Health Protection Scotland |
- Monitor international situation, using emerging epidemiological and other information to review pandemic models
- Collaborate with international organisations to assess the epidemiology of the disease and efficiency of transmission
- Ensure communications are integrated nationally with health departments/directorates and locally with NHS and other partners
- Increase awareness to enhance case detection and identification of entry of the virus into the UK at the earliest possible time
- Establish routine for collecting, collating and analysing data and reporting to central Government
- Provide interpretation of surveillance data to avoid spurious reporting of outbreaks
- Provide scientific and professional public health advice to health departments/directorates
- Maintain heightened surveillance and database of UK cases
- Maintain diagnostic and management algorithms and advise on management of suspected cases
- Support local investigation and management of cases/ outbreaks
- Support NHS in implementing any vaccination programme
- Establish plan to send appropriate specimens for antiviral susceptibility to HPA CfI
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NHS and Community Care |
- Ensure plans in place to identify, investigate, manage and report suspect cases in the UK, according to Health Protection Agencies' protocols and pandemic operational plans 'ready to go'
- Prepare to implement a national or targeted vaccination programme, if instructed by Health Directorates
- Review diagnostic capability and capacity for new virus, and roll out diagnostic tests/reagents as required
- Develop plan to implement serological tests for assessment of susceptibility and immunity to new virus, when supplied with these by HPA CfI
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Phase 6 and UK alert levels 1-4 Assessment of risk
- UK Alert level 1 may last as little as 2 weeks from declaration of the onset of the pandemic
- From onset of Alert level 2, it may take 2-4 weeks for the virus to become widely established and 7-9 weeks for activity to reach a peak
- Once Alert level 3 has been reached, there will be intense pressure on health and all other services locally for at least 6-8 weeks
- A specific pandemic influenza vaccine is unlikely to be available during the first wave
Priorities
- Reduce the impact of a pandemic in the UK
- At alert level 2, surveillance and containment of cases
- At alert levels 3 and 4, the full strategic response:
- use public health measures to reduce transmission/cases
- provide treatment and care
- maintain health and other essential services
- reduce social disruption
- provide up to date information and advice to maintain public confidence and morale
- monitor impact on organisations and services against expectations and modify if necessary
- Vaccine development - implementation of immunisation strategy when vaccine available
Main capabilities required
- Surveillance adapted to inform treatment and planning
- Interventions to reduce the impact
- Health and community care capacity to treat and care for patients
- Civil emergency response capability
- Effective communications strategy
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UK alert level 1 (actions in addition to phase 5 above) |
Scottish Government working in a UK Government framework |
- Continue cross-Government management.
- Activate Government News Co-ordination Centre to ensure co-ordinated media handling/response
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SGHD in collaboration with DH |
- Confirm declaration of pandemic and advise on implications for Scotland
- Provide public health advice
- Complete organisational arrangements for day-to-day coordination of health response, including re-deployment of staff
- Maintain daily 'battle rhythm' for reporting between HPS, SGHD, DH and COBR and provision of press briefings
- Establish public telephone help-lines
- Activate full public information campaign to prepare public for arrival of pandemic
- Prepare NHS for management of initial cases and for imminent need to move to essential care only
- With HPA/ NHS/Academia, prepare to implement prepared pandemic research protocols ( DH lead)
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Scottish Government directorates |
- Inform stakeholders to implement pandemic plans
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Health Protection Scotland |
- Finalise algorithms for management and reporting of initial Scottish
- Establish official level daily teleconferences with relevant NHS board, Health Protection staff and Scottish Government health protection staff
- Enhance surveillance in groups likely to be exposed to infection
- Prepare to implement research protocols (see above)
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NHS and Community Care |
- Ensure arrangements in place for identification, investigation, management and reporting of first UK cases
- Prepare for imminent implementation of pandemic plans, and move to essential care only
- Communicate on issues of local service provision and treatment
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UK alert level 2 |
Scottish Government working in a UK Government framework |
- Fully activate government arrangements for managing and coordinating national response
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SGHD in collaboration with DH |
- Update information to health professionals
- Instruct NHS to move to essential care only and to activate pandemic plans
- Monitor/support implementation
- Provide press briefings, and adapt public communications in response to new information and people's concerns
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Scottish Government directorates |
- Monitor activation of response and business continuity plans. Initiate monitoring/reporting arrangements
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Health Protection Scotland |
- Notify CMO of suspected/confirmed cases and agree change in UK alert level
- Ensure first 100-200 cases reported and entered in avian influenza database, including outcome of treatment
- Liaise with HPA CfI regarding their production of detailed antigenic and genetic characterisation of all novel Scottish influenza viruses and compare them with those from across UK and other countries
- Produce daily international and UK situation reports to Health Departments, to fit with battle rhythm
- Use emerging epidemiological and other data to refine modelling projections and inform policy
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NHS and Community Care |
- Manage initial cases and contacts as advised
- Cooperate with HPS to investigate, report and treat the first 100-200 cases
- Liaise with SGHD over public communications about suspected/confirmed cases
- Activate pandemic preparedness plans and prepare to restrict hospital admissions to meet the expected increased demand for hospital beds
- Support CHP's co-ordination of antiviral distribution arrangements. Monitor research projects
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UK alert levels 3 and 4 |
Scottish Government working in a UK Government framework |
- Manage and coordinate cross government response
- Develop national response strategy
- Assess impact on services, critical infrastructure etc.
- Consider whether and if to invoke emergency powers
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SGHD in collaboration with DH |
- Notify escalating UK Alert level and implications.
- Coordinate NHS response
- Maintain daily assessments of spread, and impact on health and health services
- Review planning assumptions in light of emerging information
- Review response policies in the light of changing assumptions
- Review clinical management guidelines in light of emerging information
- Monitor antiviral and other pharmaceutical usage and address logistical/supply problems
- Monitor adverse reactions to antivirals ( MHRA)
- Review antiviral policies in light of usage and supply
- Provide regular media briefings
- Continue public information campaign, using all media. Continue to monitor vaccine development/supply/policy options
- Monitor research
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Scottish Government directorates |
- Monitor maintenance of critical supplies/services and impacts on national infrastructure
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Health Protection Scotland |
- Change surveillance to reporting of aggregate data to agreed protocols
- Assess efficacy of interventions
- Monitor effectiveness of antivirals
- Collate information on bacteria causing complications (community and hospital) If appropriate, monitor vaccine uptake
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NHS and Community Care |
- Adapt response according to capacity
- Maintain local public information on health access, local policies (e.g. school closures)
- Report to Health Directorates on preparedness and prepare daily situation reports on the NHS in its area
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