Publication - Research and analysis
Introduction of an Infrastructure Charging Mechanism in Scotland: research project
This research focuses on the options for an infrastructure charging mechanism.
Annex B. High Level Options
Table B‑1 High Level Options: Geography
Principle | Priority | High Level Options | ||||
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Geography | ||||||
Local Authority Option | Regional Authority Option | Combined Authorities Option | With National Charging Option | |||
Fairness | Address cumulative impacts of development | Could address localised issues but may lack the resources and vision to address wider geographical challenges. | Ability to identify required infrastructure but potential conflict with constituent authorities. May be managed through SDPA. | Ability to meet local and regional needs as a partnership: ability to identify common infrastructure challenges | Low level charge may address more strategic development issues, but redistributive nature might mean that charge has a more limited impact on local and regional infrastructure needs. | |
Assess market variations on a wider geographical scale | Potentially limited ability to coordinate actions to address market variations. | Ability to address wider market variations, though may not reflect market areas. Less political accountability. | Potential to address complex market areas based on combination of local authority areas. Potential that it does not address market areas. | May address market variations on a much wider geographical scale but may also impact viability. | ||
Ensure examination and scrutiny | Could be tied to a local authority’s LDP process. | Potential for conflict with local authorities. However, SDPs could serve as a vehicle for developing the scheme. | Greater opportunity, depending on structure of partnership, to allow infrastructure providers and other stakeholders to participate in process. | Development and setting of tax would take place at the national level, potentially limiting the impact of local stakeholder involvement. | ||
Monitor implementation and collection | Potential limitation and conflicts in local authority monitoring. | Regional authority may lack political accountability | Political accountability recognised through membership to board; potential third party members offers some independence | Potentially complex task in monitoring and analysing contributions and use of funds. | ||
Apportioned according to need, responding to supply and demand | Local authorities may provide an adequate scale in terms of need but may not be coterminous with market areas and therefore may not reflect market need/demand. | Boundaries may not reflect market areas | Market areas within combined authorities need to be established. Better understanding of areas of need within local authorities and potential for agreement amongst partners | Not necessarily based on local or regional need. | ||
Transparency | Clear legislation to avoid conflict with S75 | Existing processes in place which would potentially ease transition | Combination with LPAs would require a regional policy document detailing items | |||
Demonstrable link between development and required charge | More localised, but limited ability to exact charges from developments for strategic infrastructure impacted by and encouraging development. | Less understanding of local needs—potential to misrepresent areas of growth due to arbitrary boundaries. | Combination of local authorities may agree infrastructure needs and appropriate distribution of funds. | ‘Tax’ breaks link between development and what is being funded. | ||
Guidelines delineated in policy | Could be issued as Supplementary Guidance. | Requires political authority to delineate policy—may be based on SDP or other regional policies. | Policies regarding Scotland-wide tariffs for strategic infrastructure may be issued at the national level. | |||
Full stakeholder involvement in charge-setting process | Potential for inclusion at plan-making stage. | Wider geographies will mean greater participation of stakeholders in detailing required infrastructure. Potential for more complex charge-setting process. | Development and setting of tax would take place at the national level, potentially limiting the impact of local stakeholder involvement. | |||
Clear procedures for redress | Legislation may provide for appropriate mechanism. | |||||
Certainty | Based on clear evidence (need, supply, demand, anticipated growth) | Local authorities may provide an adequate scale in terms of need but may not be coterminous with market areas and therefore may not reflect market need/demand. | Boundaries may not reflect market areas or may incorporate incompatible market areas. | Market areas within combined authorities need to be established. Better understanding of areas of need within local authorities and potential for agreement amongst partners. | Not necessarily based on local or regional need. | |
Clarity about what infrastructure is required and where a charge will be spent. | Potential to provide infrastructure in action programmes. Variability in detail. | Regional authority may lack ‘buy in’ from local authorities. | Group of local authorities can debate and evidence infrastructure required on a larger market area and agree apportionment. | Potential to be tied to capital investment plans (Infrastructure Investment Plan), NPF. | ||
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Charges should be used to encourage sustainable economic growth | Charges can be tied to action programmes and a spatial strategy within a local authority but may not meet wider geographical objectives. | Infrastructure charging funds may be applied to support sustainable growth within regional boundaries, but this may not reflect market areas. | As above, and this can be employed to deliver development in growth areas within the combined local authority area. | May deliver nationally important infrastructure with the aim of supporting policy objectives. | |
Clarity over intersection with broader funding packages | May be tied to existing programmes within local authorities (e.g. TIF). | Unclear how a regional authority would access alternative funding. | Best practice shared amongst local authorities; may be based on established City Deal regions and delivery structure. Potential for risk share between Local Authorities? | Additional to capital budget and associated funding/financing. | ||
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Administrative boundaries should not be arbitrary | Local Authority boundaries may not be best suited to capture greater market areas | Regional boundaries may reflect functional market areas but are likely to be based on political or historic boundaries which may not be reflective. | Boundaries may reflect ‘growth areas’ (not necessarily based on constituent LPA boundaries) and thus reflect functional housing market areas. | Would be redistributive tax and would not depend on an administrative boundary. |
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No redistribution out with a market area or region | N/A | |||||
Exemptions should be driven by encouraging viability | Dependent on Administration and required infrastructure. | |||||
Efficiency | Clear process of collection | Dependent on Administration. | ||||
Robust details of infrastructure delivery | Could follow development plan process. | Limitation in ability to plan and deliver infrastructure—potential to repurpose SDPs to support this. | Limitation in ability of partnership to ‘plan’ for infrastructure. | Would be tied to national infrastructure programme. | ||
Broader funding package established at outset | Would supplement existing funding sources (e.g. TIFs, prudential borrowing through PWLB). | Potential limitation in borrowing power of a regional body. Lack of legitimacy in planning and delivery? | Partnership or area based on City Deals can establish best practice and serve as a basis for identifying additional funding streams. | Additional to capital budget and associated funding/financing. | ||
Should not consume local authority resources | Potential for constrained resources amongst planning authorities. | Potential to administer large geographical areas, though unclear how this would be resourced. | Broader partnership and ability to share resources and best practice. | Would be tied to national infrastructure programme. | ||
Avoid lengthy negotiations in payments | N/A | |||||
Avoid a ‘land tax’ on a site-by-site basis |
N/A |
Table B‑2 High Level Options: Mechanisms
Principle | Priority | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
High Level Options | |||||
Mechanisms | |||||
Per Unit of Development Option | Charges based on Extent of LVU Option | Charges based on Quantum of Development Option | Charge based on final value of development Option | ||
Fairness | Address cumulative impacts of development | May not address needs and may result in imbalances of unit/development types, resulting in unsustainable development. | Limit to apply to wider range of developments due to complexity and limit of uplift value. | Would adequately identify ‘volume’ of development in terms of floor space. Could be categorised according to use. | Complexity might impact the delivery of funds and development. |
Assess market variations on a wider geographical scale | As above, per unit of development charges may result in imbalances in limiting the ability to reflect ‘floor space’ and volume of development. | Potential to reflect market variation but may produce sub-standard development. | Charges on floor space may be set to reflect market variations. | Potential to reflect market variation but onerous. | |
Ensure examination and scrutiny | Dependent on governance and administration. | ||||
Monitor implementation and collection | Simple to administer and understand. Potential for straightforward monitoring. | Potential to be overly complex and difficult to monitor. | Straightforward dissemination but more difficult in administration due to potential for change in floor space, identifying exemptions, etc. | Potential to be overly complex and difficult to monitor as it is difficult to know when a final sale takes place and whether the transaction was at open market value. | |
Apportioned according to need, responding to supply and demand | May unfairly prioritise one development type over another and therefore misrepresent the appropriate contribution required to meet a broader infrastructure needs. | Will reflect uplifted values, but this may not accurately represent what infrastructure is needed, what is already provided. | May unfairly prioritise one development type over another and therefore misrepresent the appropriate contribution required to meet a broader infrastructure needs. | Will reflect uplifted values, but this may not accurately represent what infrastructure is needed, what is already provided. | |
Transparency | |||||
Clear legislation to avoid conflict with S75 | N/A | ||||
Demonstrable link between development and required charge | Dependent on administration and geography. | ||||
Guidelines delineated in policy | May be set out in policy. | More difficult to justify and set out in policy given shift in interest rates, land values, etc. More guidance required regarding negotiation process. | May be set out in policy. | More difficult to justify and set out in policy given shift in interest rates, land values, etc. More guidance required regarding negotiation process. | |
Clear guidance to prevent overlap between charging mechanisms | Dependent on administration and geography. | ||||
Full stakeholder involvement in chargesetting process | Dependent on governance and geography. | ||||
Principle | Priority | High Level Options | |||
Mechanisms | |||||
Per Unit of Development Option | Charges based on Extent of LVU Option | Charges based on Quantum of Development Option | Charge based on final value of development Option | ||
Clear procedures for redress | N/A | ||||
Certainty | Based on clear evidence (need, supply, demand, anticipated growth) | Mechanisms equally dependent on evidence, though land value uplift mechanism will require frequent reassessment. | |||
Clarity about what infrastructure is required and where a charge will be spent | Dependent on governance and administration. | ||||
Charges should be used to encourage sustainable economic growth | Variable charges may help direct development in most appropriate areas. As noted, potential imbalances depending on the sensitivity of the charging set. | Potential to reflect market variation but may produce sub-standard development. | Variable charges may help direct development in most appropriate areas. | Charges may not accurately reflect sales values and may be difficult to justify. | |
Clarity over intersection with broader funding packages | N/A | ||||
Administrative boundaries should not be arbitrary | N/A | ||||
No redistribution out with a market area or region | N/A | ||||
Exemptions should be driven by encouraging viability | Identified in policy. | ||||
Efficiency | Clear process of collection | In all cases would be payable at some point in development process, though may vary depending on system of administration (e.g. whether funds are payable to consenting authority). | |||
Robust details of infrastructure delivery | N/A | ||||
Broader funding package established at outset | N/A | ||||
Should not consume local authority resources | Relatively straightforward process of implementation and collection. | Potential to be administratively complex and resource intensive. | |||
Avoid lengthy negotiations in payments | Less complex as based on standardised rates. | Subject to negotiation and complex. | Could be subject to negotiation where there are changes to applications. | Subject to negotiation and complex. | |
Avoid a ‘land tax’ on a site-by-site basis. | Specific to development but based on standardised rates. | Complex and site-specific. | Specific to development but based on standardised rates. | Complex and site-specific. |
Table B‑3 High Level Options: Use and Purpose of Fund
Principle | Priority | High Level Options | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Fund | Purpose | ||||
Itemised Option | Pooled Option | Maintenance Option | Capital Costs Option | ||
Fairness |
Address cumulative impacts of development | Can provide evidenced and transparent infrastructure items to meet demands of anticipated growth. | Can provide flexibility in meeting potential infrastructure requirements. | Could meet longer term impacts and administration. | Focusses on meeting infrastructure need rather than maintenance. |
Assess market variations on a wider geographical scale | Less flexibility in meeting market changes in the short term? | Pooled funds may be distributed according to projects as needed over a wider geographical area. | Less concerned with addressing market variations. | May better address infrastructure delivery on a wider scale. | |
Ensure examination and scrutiny | Potential to be interrogated at plan stage, for example, as part of an action programme. | Less clarity regarding allocation of funds and required infrastructure. | May be equally subject to scrutiny at examination or similar review. | ||
Monitor implementation and collection | Easier to monitor progress against implementation and | Less clarity and not as easy to monitor. | Collection may be straightforward, but use of funds by local authorities less straightforward. | Simplicity Dependent on manner of collection. | |
Apportioned according to need, responding to supply and demand | Can be established in an infrastructure investment plan and delivered accordingly. | Pooled resources may anticipate need on a wider geographical scale and delivery infrastructure not otherwise deliverable based on contributions from local developments. | Less based on need in regard to growth but on use of asset. | Contribution to capital costs reflective of need to support infrastructure delivery where required. | |
Transparency |
Clear legislation to avoid conflict with S75 | Matter for national legislation. | |||
Demonstrable link between development and required charge | Dependent on mechanism employed. Itemised option easier to demonstrate direct link? Pooled option could be more difficult to do this, however, a wider benefit may be determinable? |
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Guidelines delineated in policy | More straightforwardly identifies what infrastructure is to be delivered and by what means. May be tied to an action programme. |
More flexibility, though requires additional policy to guide its operation. |
Less straightforward to implement in policy as it is unclear when funds will be required for maintenance. |
Relatively straightforward to delineate in plans and policies, depending on mechanism, governance and administration. |
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Clear guidance to prevent overlap between charging mechanisms | |||||
Full stakeholder involvement in charge-setting process and identifying infrastructure | Dependent on geography and governance. | ||||
Clear procedures for redress | Each method would require a system for redress set out within the administrative process. | ||||
Certainty |
Based on clear evidence (need, supply, demand, anticipated growth) | Both methods would require evidence to support allocation of funds in addition to charge applied. | Dependent on type of asset, though maintenance could be based on expected use and an agreed 10 or 20-year plan. Potential to be well-evidenced based on anticipated use. | Capital costs included in action programmes would be costed and based on anticipated need for infrastructure | |
Clarity about what infrastructure is required and where a charge will be spent | More straightforwardly identifies what infrastructure is to be delivered and by what means. | Dependent on geography and governance (i.e. if there is a spatial plan or infrastructure plan). | |||
Charges should be used to encourage sustainable economic growth | Can aid in delivering a spatial plan and addressing development constraints in a measurable fashion. | Potential to apply funds on a wider geographic scale and respond to changing circumstances. | Does not necessarily respond to priorities for economic growth. | Responds more appropriately to growth. | |
Clarity over intersection with broader funding packages | Dependent on geography and governance. | Dependent on geography and governance. | |||
Administrative boundaries should not be arbitrary | Dependent on geography selected. |
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No redistribution out with a market area or region | |||||
Exemptions should be driven by encouraging viability | Matter to be delineated in policy. | N/A | N/A | ||
Efficiency |
Clear process of collection | Dependent on mechanism employed. | Dependent on mechanism employed. Potential issue in terms of access to funds by infrastructure providers. | Dependent on mechanisms employed. | |
Robust and evidenced details of infrastructure delivery | More clarity with regard to what is required in terms of funding and when it is expected to be delivered. | Potential for evidenced and robust delivery plan—dependent on the mechanism and geography. | Dependent on mechanism and governance. | ||
Broader funding package established at outset | Both would require additional funding and financing sources to deliver infrastructure. | Dependent on mechanism and governance. | |||
Should not consume local authority resources | More complex in identifying infrastructure up front, but potentially less resource intensive in project delivery. | Potentially complex in administering and therefore resource intensive. | Dependent on system of administration. | ||
Avoid lengthy negotiations in payments | Dependent on mechanism. | ||||
Avoid a ‘land tax’ on a site-by-site basis | Dependent on mechanism. |
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