Review of Management Options for the Landing Obligation

Government Controlled Buffer Zone

Allow vessels to access quota for incidental over-quota catches

Denmark, United States

• Value of additional quota held at point of use
• Tool to cover uncertainty and variability with catches
• Can be used as incentive for REM
• Can work to protect individual holdings
• Allows vessels to stay at sea for longer
• Access rules can be designed to change behaviour (increased selectivity)

• Open-Access Issues
• Administrative role for government
• Industry may not want a high proportion of quota held centrally
• Might be more efficient for industry to manage this type of pooling system

Deemed Value Payment for Over-quota catches

Mitigate open-access conditions in quota pooling systems

New Zealand

• Can be set to incentivise the purchase of quota before use of pooled quota and to land over-quota catch
• Ramping rates can be set to protect critical choke species
• Revenue used to promote selectivity and research

• Requires information regarding quota prices cost structure of industry and landings price
• Would require changes to quota trading mechanisms to produce information on quota prices
• Practical issues in setting the right levy price

Withhold the Economic Use of the Catch

Mitigate open-access conditions in quota pooling systems

Iceland

• Creates disincentives to use quota pool
• Revenue used to promote selectivity and research

• Requires information on variable costs of vessels

Renegotiate TAC Allocations

Improve alignment between quota holdings and catch compositions

• Potential beneficial impact upon overcapacity at EU level
• MS holdings more accurately reflect current patterns of abundance and distribution

• Long-run objective
• Likely to be politically arduous and lengthy process
• Scotland likely to be net loser

European/Regional Open Trading Platform

Improve alignment between quota holdings and catch compositions

• Increase international quota swapping
• Improve information and efficiency or current mechanisms

• Political fear of Scottish quota leaving Scotland
• Requires collective action and consent at EU level

Retrospective balancing

Allow fleet to cover incidental catches

New Zealand

• Promotes compliance
• Helps vessels access cover incidental catches

• Required changes to quota trading arrangements

Online real-time public trading platform in Scotland

Improve quota trading mechanisms, improve alignment between quota holdings and catch compositions, allow fleet to cover incidental catches

Canada, Denmark, US, New Zealand, Iceland

• Promotes compliance
• Helps vessels access additional quota
• Improves information and efficiency of trades
• Can be designed to prevent concentration of quota holdings
• Potential to reduce leasing costs

• Requires changes to quota management
• May promote concentration of fleet

Allow FQAs to be sold as small units

Improve alignment between quota holdings and catch compositions

New Zealand

• Allows vessels to hold quota portfolios that more accurately reflect true catch
• Wider socio-economic benefits (new entry)

• Potential to change ownership structure of fleet with uncertain consequences

PO managed Risk Pools for Choke Species Quota

Allow fleet to cover incidental catches

Denmark, Canada, US

• May be more effective than Government buffer Zone
• Create downward pressure upon catching choke species
• Can be designed to incentivise behaviour changes (greater selectivity)

• Administrative burden for POs
• May undermine the quota investments of some
• Enforcement issues for POs
• Open-access issues have to be addressed

Demonstrating the Right to Catch

Enforcement of the discard ban

• Additional powers to POs to enforce ban
• Bottom-up enforcement often increases legitimacy

• May not be practical given licences changes
• Political objection to giving POs this power

Mixed Fisheries Management TAC/Quota Regime

Improve alignment between quota holdings and catch compositions

• Gives fishers more control over their catches
• Quota regime more accurately reflects distribution and abundance of stocks

• Control over single species los
• Practical application far off- highly theoretical

Remote Electronic Monitoring

Monitoring and Enforcement

Denmark, US, Canada

• Most effective method for full control
• Aids compliance
• No great effect on pelagic fleet
• Can be used to provide evidence for the removal of additional regulations ( DAS)
• Potential for level playing field within Scotland

• Likely to expose demersal fleet to risk of bankruptcy/reduction in operations
• Political contentious
• Issues with creating level playing field across Europe

Observer Programmes

Monitoring and Enforcement

US, Canada, Norway

• More acceptable to some in industry

• Unlikely to be effective
• High cost and administration

Reference Fleets

Monitoring and Enforcement

• More acceptable to some in industry
• Less costly than observers

• Reactive to bad behaviour
• Room for illegal discarding to continue
• No level- playing field

High financial penalties for illegal discarding

Enforcement

Iceland, US, New Zealand

• Incentives for compliance
• Incentives for greater selectivity

• Reduce operations of some vessels

Increase demand for low value species

Utilize bycatch

Iceland, US

• Increase prices for low value fish
• Aids compliance- incentive to land
• Greater utilisation of resources- less waste

• Could create incentive to target fish and overexploited
• Development of new markets rare

Use bycatch for non-human consumption

Utilize bycatch

New Zealand, US, Canada, Denmark

• Greater utilisation of resources- less waste
• Fishermen receive better price for bycatch
• Aids compliance- incentives to land

• Could create incentives to target new species