Scotland: A Good Global Citizen - a Scottish perspective on climate, defence, security and external affairs

Security

National security is formally reserved to the UK Government. However, it is also clear that decisions on the future conduct of national security can directly impact on devolved areas of competence.

The impact of a national security incident in Scotland, or against wider Scottish interests, would be experienced directly by the people living and working in Scotland. The incident response would be wholly or mainly carried out by Scottish bodies. The consequence management of such an incident is entirely devolved. Scottish Government Ministers are ultimately responsible for the funding of those who would deliver the response/consequence management. They are accountable to the public and the Scottish Parliament for how Scotland conducts itself. The recent cyber incidents relating to SolarWinds and the ransomware attack on the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), which critically affected their internal systems and communications, are clear examples of how the Scottish Government and its response partners, including the National Cyber Security Centre, have responded to and managed incidents affecting Scottish organisations and Scotland.

Ensuring that the response to a national security related incident is appropriate and proportionate and aligned with similar such capacities and capabilities across the UK are therefore decisions for the Scottish Government. That such decisions are taken in the face of an increasingly complex set of national security threats, and the seamless nature of those threats, makes the lack of engagement from the UK Government, detailed elsewhere in this paper, all the more illogical. Similarly, no longer benefiting from being in the EU poses significant issues to the UK and Scotland's ability to cooperate with our closest international partners to keep our citizens safe from all forms of crime, which the UK Government should recognise.

The Scottish Government absolutely recognises the need for close cooperation on defence and security across the UK. However, this needs to take the form of a genuine partnership, which currently does not exist. And the UK Government shows no signs of acknowledging the necessity of this approach or, on the basis of the development of the Integrated Review, recognising the importance of meaningful engagement. This failure to engage runs the very real risk of weakening the defence and security of our nations.

While the Scottish Government acknowledges that the transnational aspects of serious and organised crime can lead to national security considerations, the downstream effects of such activity more often than not flow into devolved areas of responsibility. A properly integrated response requires full consultation and engagement with the Scottish Government and Scottish law enforcement. The Scottish Government was pleased to note Sir Craig Mackey's acknowledgment of the Scottish Crime Campus model in his review of the UK organised crime strategy.