Cameron House Fatal Accident Inquiry recommendations: Short Life Working Group final report

3.0 Cameron House Hotel, the fire and inquiry

3.1 The building

The building was an 18^th century “B” listed building and was converted into a hotel in 1985. Modern extensions were built to both sides and also to the rear. The main building of the hotel spanned over several floors and contained the main reception area, some bedrooms, function rooms and office space. The extension to the left of the main building contained numerous bedrooms across four storeys. The hotel had a total of 136 bedrooms which were located in the main building and the modern extension. The extension to the right of the main building contained leisure facilities, a restaurant, bar and grill, and other function rooms.

3.2 The Fire

On 18 December 2017, following a building fire at the hotel, two people, Simon Midgley and Richard Dyson, lost their lives due to exposure to smoke and fire gases. Three people were treated in hospital. The seat of the fire broke out within the older fabric of the building after a night porter left a plastic bag of ash in a concierge's cupboard at the reception area which contained newspapers and kindling.

A joint fire investigation took place between the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS) and Police Scotland and their report on the incident was submitted to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service’s Health and Safety Investigation Unit on 31 October 2019. An independent Crown Office review concluded that an FAI should be held into the fatalities.

3.3 The Fatal Accident Inquiry

Expert witness testimony to the inquiry explained that fire spread within concealed cavities and voids often spreads undetected and will spread more rapidly in traditionally constructed 18^th century buildings of this type. The inquiry stated that the fire broke out because of the “hot embers within ash igniting combustibles within the concierge cupboard of the Hotel”. Evidence provided at the inquiry outlined that the fire spread from the cupboard through voids and cavities in the structure of the building and/or as a result of flashover leading to ceiling failure and escaped into the reception area once the door to the cupboard had been opened, thus causing fire and smoke and fire gases to spread extensively throughout the old part of the Hotel.

The porter later admitted to breaching the Health and Safety at Work Act. Cameron House also pleaded guilty to “breaches of fire safety rules” under the Fire Scotland Act and were fined £500,000.

Sheriff McCartney noted “defects in the system of working at the Hotel” which included:

• The “careless disposal of ash in unsuitable receptacles and areas culminating in hot embers being placed within the concierge cupboard”;
• The “lack of a written Standard Operating Procedure re-enforced by staff training, notwithstanding the opportunities to remedy that situation”;
• The “absence of appropriate equipment for safe disposal of ash”;
• The “full ash bins in the service area, and lack of a coherent system to regularly empty same, and the absence of instructions to staff relating what to do with ash when bins were full”;
• The “presence of combustibles within the concierge cupboard, notwithstanding a warning that such should have been removed”.

This was despite the recommendations of two fire risk assessments in 2016 and 2017, where the lack of a formal procedure for the disposal of ash was noted by independent fire safety inspectors. In August 2017, the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS) also warned the hotel’s manager about the risks of “storing combustibles in the concierge cupboard” and the “potential danger of fire spreading rapidly through the building because of its age and voids”. A follow-up letter was sent in November 2017.

The Sheriff also pointed out several other factors that were relevant to the circumstances of the deaths of Mr Midgley and Mr Dyson, for instance, a delay in obtaining a guest list in which to carry out an accurate roll call.

Throughout the FAI hearing, the benefits of sprinklers were shared, highlighting that it would “significantly slow the spread of flame and would extend the margin of safety for available escape time”. The Crown also iterated that it was a “real or likely possibility that, had sprinklers been installed and worked to inhibit the extent and spread of the fire and smoke, [Mr Dyson and Mr Midgley] would, like other guests, have been able safely to escape the building”.

3.4 Recommendations made by the Inquiry

The Determination of Sheriff Thomas McCartney into the deaths of Simon Midgley and Richard John Dyson under The Inquiries into Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths etc (Scotland) Act 2016, was published on 11 January 2023 outlining six recommendations, as follows:

1). Owners or operators of hotels or similar sleeping accommodation in Scotland should, where appropriate for their operation, have in place up to date and robust procedures, informed by an assessment of risks, to ensure that ash from open fires in hotels is removed and disposed of in a safe manner, thereby avoiding the risk of fires being started by the careless disposal of ash. (Directed at Hotel and B&B industry).

2). Owners or operators of hotels or similar sleeping accommodation in Scotland should ensure that clear and robust arrangements are in place for promptly ensuring all persons are accounted for in the event of evacuation of such accommodation in the event of a fire, such arrangements, where possible, to address foreseeable contingencies such as difficulties in accessing guest lists, or inclement weather. (Directed at Hotel and B&B industry).

3). Owners or operators of hotels or similar sleeping accommodation in Scotland should ensure that robust arrangements are in place to ensure that all staff (including in particular, night-shift staff) have experience of evacuation drills which may, for example, involve night-time staff being asked to attend a day-time evacuation drill and/or mock drills taking place during “night shift” hours. (Directed at Hotel and B&B industry).

4). The Scottish Government should consider introducing for future conversions of historic buildings to be used as hotel accommodation a requirement to have active fire suppression systems installed. (Directed at Scottish Government).

5). The Scottish Government should constitute an expert working group to more fully explore the special risks which existing hotels and similar premises may pose through the presence of hidden cavities or voids, varying standards of workmanships, age, and the variance from current standards and to consider revising the guidance provided by the Scottish Government and others. (Directed at Scottish Government).

6). Scottish Fire and Rescue Service should reduce the time-period between a fire safety audit inspection and the issue of a written outcome report. (Directed at Scottish Fire and Rescue Service).