Standing Committee on Pandemic Preparedness minutes: May 2023

Attendees and apologies

• Professor Andrew Morris

• Professor Dame Anna Dominiczak

• Professor Julie Fitzpatrick

• Professor Linda Bauld

• Professor Mathew Williams

• Professor Tom Evans

• Dr Audrey MacDougall

• Professor Stephen Reicher

• Professor Sir Aziz Sheikh

• Professor Mark Woolhouse

Observers

• Redacted S.38(1)(b)
• Redacted S.38(1)(b)
• Daniel Kleinberg
• Redacted S.38(1)(b)
• Redacted S.38(1)(b)
• Redacted S.38(1)(b)

Secretariat

• Redacted S.38(1)(b)
• Redacted S.38(1)(b)

Items and actions

1.    Introduction 

The Chair welcomed Committee members to the meeting. 

2.     Scottish Risk Assessment

The Chair welcomed colleagues from the Scottish Government’s Civil Contingencies team who gave a short presentation on the Scottish Risk Assessment (SRA) and outlined the methodology that underpins this. The SRA supplements the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) which the Committee received information on at its previous meeting. The SRA provides information to Scotland’s responders to enable them to plan and prepare accordingly. The two risk assessments that were considered today were the emerging infectious diseases (EID) and the pandemic risk assessments. 

The Committee discussed the assumptions underpinning the risk assessments and advised the following 

• for pandemics, the possibility of asymptomatic infections should be taken into account
• the level of mortality also was noted as being particularly high and possibly  carried over from pandemic planning in the past; however, in terms of the numerical assumptions, these appear broadly correct however
• the dispersal of the population in Scotland is greater than the rest of the UK and this can pose additional challenges. The precise numbers attached to scenarios have some benefits for planning though the huge uncertainties should be noted. Ranges were suggested as potentially being more suitable to capture the large range of variability in different scenarios. There is value in underlining that there can be significant different ranges depending on the nature of the pathogen
• for EID, group members commented that the preamble considers a novel pathogen arising in another country; it then highlights known pathogens that are prevalent in other parts of the world. The language around this may need to be reviewed
• impact on healthcare is rated 5 though the free text language does not convey the same severity. The capacity in Scotland, for reasons of transport and access to suitable care, is unlikely to cope with more than a handful of cases of an EID . Scotland has no designed high consequence infectious disease (HCID) unit and the UK has limited HCID beds so management of patients in existing facilities despite best endeavour would potentially increase the magnitude of impact
• when considering economic impacts and fatalities it is important to factor in assumptions of workforce absences. There is a greater burden of ill health in Scotland though the extent to which this will impact fatalities in a pandemic will depend on the nature of the pathogen
• the importance of preparing for a range of different scenarios, rather than the pandemic we have just had was underlined
• the importance of connectivity to other countries and their responses was raised, particularly in the context of a pathogen that emerges in another country
• the impact of workforce vacancies in the NHS on planning and the impact of different scenarios was highlighted. A question was also posed about the resources available to tackle pandemics. Industrial action could be another factor to take into account, though the high-level nature of the SRA was reiterated here. The NSRA provides comprehensive and detailed assessments underpinning the risks for pandemics and EIDs. The recent UK CMOs report was noted as a useful resource to support the risk assessment of different types of pandemics. There is a reciprocal relationship between resilience planners in Scotland and England with information shared between both teams

The Chair thanked the resilience team for their work.

 

3.     Interim Report – Next Steps

The Committee was given an overview of the proposed work plan for 2023. 

The terms of the Commission from the First Minister run until the end of February 2024. The aim in practice will be to have a viable draft of the final report by September 2023.

The final report will follow on from the interim report, drawing on the recommendations from the main report and the issues raised in the appendix. A brief overview of the four workstreams that follow on from the four recommendations in the main report was given and updates from each of these will be fed back into the main Committee meetings as these progress. 

The point about pandemic preparedness needing to encompass outbreak preparedness , as raised at the International Reference Group meeting, was reiterated. The value of local actions in the COVID-19 response was also raised at that meeting and should be noted in the final report. 

There are many other programmes relevant to the work of SCoPP and connections with those groups should be maintained, linking to the work of this Committee. The Pathogen Genomics Group was raised as an example of one such group. 

The risk of misinformation was noted as a risk which sits across different areas and where work should be undertaken now, linking with the issues raised in the appendix of the interim report.  

On data and innovations it was noted that it is not sufficient to develop tools or solutions that are kept on the shelf. Solutions should be developed which are useful for current service provision and can be used outside of pandemics. 

The Chair summarised next steps:

• a work plan for 2023 going to September should be defined
• consider comprehensive outbreak preparednessthat supports local activity
• cross-sectoral partnership in Scotland will be essential to avoid siloed work and connections to other expertise and relevant groups
• the opportunity to define functions and capabilities which are useful outside of pandemics – expanding this to outbreaks (recent examples of non A-E hepatitis and Strep A highlight the relevance of this)
• in early January a work plan will be shared with Committee members

Five short-life subgroups should be supported to do an environment scan of where we are now, where we want to get to, and what the functions and leadership required to reach that are with an indication of resource required for this. 

• prioritisation and specificity are key

Committee members commented on the positive role of the Science Media Centre and the role this plays in the communication and science in the media. 

 

4.    AoB

The Committee was given a brief update on the Scottish and UK Inquiries and the information being collated for these. They also received a brief update on the WHO Pandemic Instrument. 

The Chair thanked Committee members for their participation.