Understanding extremism in Scotland: public sector practitioner perceptions and views

1. Introduction

The Scottish Government commissioned Thinks Insight & Strategy to conduct research to explore public sector practitioner understandings and experiences of extremism in Scotland. The project took place between April 2022 and January 2023, with fieldwork carried out between 10 May and 30 September 2022. This research is part of a wider programme of work to improve understanding of extremism in Scotland. Complementary research has been commissioned and conducted by the Scottish Government to explore the understandings and experiences of the Scottish public and stakeholders:

• Understanding extremism in Scotland: Stakeholder perceptions and views (Scottish Government, 2023a)
• Understanding extremism in Scotland: Public perceptions and experiences (Scottish Government, 2023b)

This section provides an overview of the background to this research programme, and outlines the aims and research questions specific to the research exploring public sector practitioner understandings and experiences of extremism.

1.1. Background and context

Prevent policy

Prevent is a strand of the UK Government’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy CONTEST (Home Office, 2018). The purpose of Prevent is to ‘stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’. While counter-terrorism (and therefore Prevent) is a reserved matter and the responsibility of the UK Government, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) places a duty on sectors that are devolved from Westminster to the Scottish Government (including local authorities, health and social care, education, prisons, and the police) to pay ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. This is known as the Prevent duty.

The Prevent duty guidance for Scotland (Home Office, 2021a) outlines how specified authorities are expected to comply with this duty. There is sector-specific guidance for further education institutions (Home Office, 2021b) and higher education institutions (Home Office, 2021c).

The Scottish Government supports the specified sectors to fulfil their obligations under the Prevent duty, and ensures that mechanisms are in place for safeguarding and supporting individuals who may be susceptible to being drawn into terrorism as outlined in the Prevent Multi-Agency Panel (PMAP) Duty Guidance (Home Office, 2021d).

In Scotland, the approach taken to Prevent is tailored to the distinct Scottish context and the specific challenges faced by Scottish communities. Emphasis is placed on early intervention, safeguarding, and preventing people from becoming alienated or isolated, with the aim of reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience to extremist narratives.

While the focus of the research is on extremism, the Prevent duty is the link between the practitioners who participated in this research and extremism, and therefore is another key focus of the research.

Key definitions

The UK Government currently adopts the following definition of extremism:

‘Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.’ (Home Office, 2011: 107)

This definition was introduced in the 2011 Prevent strategy, and is used as a working definition rather than a legal definition. It was used in the UK Government’s Counter-Extremism Strategy (Home Office, 2015), which set out the UK Government’s approach to countering ‘both violent and non-violent’ extremism. However, counter-extremism is a devolved matter and the Counter-Extremism Strategy and the UK Government’s definition of extremism were not adopted in Scotland.

At present, therefore, the Scottish Government does not have an official definition of extremism. A review of evidence carried out by the Scottish Government (2023c) explored how extremism is defined in existing literature, and highlighted the challenges associated with defining the concept. For example:

• Various factors, such as the prevailing political culture, value systems and personal characteristics and experiences, influence how the term is understood, meaning it is an inherently relative and ambiguous term (Sotlar, 2004).
• Extremism is often conceptualised as a continuum of beliefs and behaviours, which makes it difficult to capture in a definition (Wilkinson and van Rij, 2019).
• Defining extremism too broadly can risk impeding rights to free speech and protest, while defining it too narrowly can lead to potentially extremist behaviours being overlooked (Redgrave et al., 2020).

These challenges have meant that while a range of definitions of extremism have been proposed, there is a general lack of consensus on how it should be defined.

Further to the debate around defining extremism, there are also conceptual debates around the related terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘hate crime’. In the UK, the Terrorism Act (2000) defines terrorism as the use or threat of any of the following actions, where the action is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and is used for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause:

• Serious violence against a person
• Serious damage to property
• Endangering a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action
• Creating a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public
• Seriously interfering with or disrupting an electronic system

In addition to the above, the use or threat of action which involves the use of firearms or explosives is considered terrorism regardless of whether or not the action is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation, or to intimidate the public or a section of the public.

However, terrorism is defined differently by governments elsewhere, as well as by global institutions and academics, meaning there is no universally agreed-upon understanding of the term. For example, NATO defines terrorism as ‘the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives’ (NATO, 2016). Although there is no shared definition of the term in academia, in recent decades there has been increasing consensus in the literature that the core factor in terrorism is ‘that it entails the intent to generate a wider psychological impact beyond the immediate victims’ (Richards, 2015).

Reasons presented for this lack of agreed-upon definition include that it is difficult to encapsulate the wide range of behaviours, actions and beliefs associated with terrorism in one definition, and that the term is subjective. For example, the position that ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’ (Ganzor, 2010). Due to a lack of a universal definition, terrorism is generally defined at a national level.

Hate crime is another term associated with extremism which poses challenges around its definition due to its subjective nature. For example, Garland (2012) discusses issues involved with deciding which identity groups are categorised as specific hate crime groups and which are not. The Scottish Government tends to use Lord Bracadale’s definition developed as part of his independent review of hate crime legislation in Scotland, which refers to hate crime as ‘the term used to describe behaviour which is both criminal and rooted in prejudice’ (Lord Bracadale, 2018). Police Scotland (2023a) define hate crime as ‘any crime which is perceived by the victim or any other person as being motivated (wholly or partly) by malice or ill will towards a social group’ with the five groups covered including disability, race, religion or belief, sexual orientation or transgender identity.

Understanding extremism in Scotland

The evidence review carried out by the Scottish Government (2023c) identified evidence gaps relating to the extent and nature of extremism in Scotland, which impede understanding of whether current approaches are appropriate and impactful in preventing the spread of extremist ideologies and reducing terrorism in the Scottish context. In particular, the review showed that while tentative conclusions can be drawn from data relating to terrorist activity, Prevent referrals and public attitudes, there is a lack of research evidence on the prevalence and nature of extremism in Scotland specifically.

The Scottish Government is therefore developing a programme of research which aims to support understanding of extremism and Prevent delivery in Scotland. In the first instance, this research has sought to explore understandings, perceptions and experiences of extremism from the perspective of the Scottish public, stakeholders^[4] and public sector practitioners, in three distinct but related projects.

The aim of this research is to develop understanding of how these groups define and understand extremism; their views on the extent to which extremism is a problem in Scotland and the types of extremism they consider to be more and less prevalent; as well as on how well they perceive current approaches to countering extremism in Scotland to be working.

This report focuses on the findings from the research exploring public sector practitioner understandings and experiences of extremism in Scotland. For the purposes of this research, public sector practitioners include professionals working in sectors which, under the Prevent duty, must pay ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’, including local authorities, health and social care, education, prisons, and the police^[5].

1.2. Public sector practitioners and their role in Prevent

This research was carried out with a wide range of public sector practitioners with diverse job roles in the sectors with a statutory obligation to fulfil the Prevent duty (the local authority, health and social care, education, prisons and police sectors). A broad breakdown of types of job roles of public sector practitioners who participated in this research can be found in Appendix A. Public sector practitioners who are not obligated to deliver the Prevent duty, such as emergency service workers or those in the military, were not within the scope of this research.

In the Prevent duty guidance for Scotland (Home Office, 2021a)^[6], it is noted that how sectors comply with the duty, and the extent to which they do, will depend on many factors, such as how much interaction they have with vulnerable individuals. While there is variation by sector, therefore, the guidance states that all relevant public sector staff should be trained to recognise signs that someone has been or is being drawn into terrorism and locate available support, including making a referral when necessary.

1.3. Research aim and questions

This research aimed to explore understandings and experiences of extremism from the perspective of public sector practitioners working to deliver Prevent in Scotland.

The research questions were:

Understanding extremism

• How do public sector practitioners working to deliver Prevent in Scotland define and understand extremism?
• How far do public sector practitioners’ understandings of extremism in Scotland align with definitions and categorisations adopted in other contexts?
• What are public sector practitioners’ views on the boundaries of extremism? For example, when does an act or behaviour cross the threshold into extremism?
• Do public sector practitioners working in different areas of Scotland or with different communities diverge in how they understand and perceive extremism?

Views on extremism in Scotland

• To what extent do public sector practitioners perceive extremism to be a threat or problem in Scotland? Do they feel that this has changed over time?
• How do public sector practitioners perceive extremism in Scotland to manifest as views, behaviours and actions, particularly in the communities they work in?
• What are public sector practitioners’ views on the ideologies or types of extremism that are of most concern or growing concern currently, and why? What are views on the key drivers of these concerns?
• Do public sector practitioners working in different areas of Scotland or with different communities diverge in how they perceive current threats?
• How has the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns had an impact on what public sector practitioners are seeing in terms of spread of ideologies?

Public sector practitioner experiences of extremism

• To what extent have public sector practitioners observed or experienced extremism in Scotland?

Understanding the Prevent duty

• To what extent are public sector practitioners aware of the Prevent duty, and how well do they feel they understand it?

Delivering the Prevent duty

• Do public sector practitioners consider Prevent as part of their day-to-day work? What processes are in place for this in their workplace?
• What aspects of extremism do public sector practitioners feel more and less confident in understanding?
• How well-equipped and supported do public sector practitioners feel in their ability to recognise and respond to extremism?

Views on Prevent in Scotland

• How favourable are public sector practitioners’ opinions or impressions of Prevent?
• How effective do public sector practitioners consider the current approaches to reducing extremism in Scotland to be, and why?
• Do public sector practitioners working in different areas of Scotland or with different communities diverge in how they perceive the effectiveness of responses to extremism?

Two original research questions were found to be beyond the scope of this work and may be suitable for further research with public sector practitioners working closely with extremism and Prevent:

• What do public sector practitioners find to be most effective in preventing the spread of extremist ideologies?
• How has the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns had an impact on public sector practitioners’ abilities to monitor and respond to any changes in terms of spread of ideologies?

1.4. Report structure

Having introduced the background to the research and the research questions, the report sets out the methodology in detail, followed by presentation and analysis of the findings. The findings section first presents practitioners’ understanding, views and experiences of extremism, then explores their understanding, experiences of delivering and views on Prevent and the Prevent duty. The report ends with a conclusion chapter that sets out the implications of this research.