Understanding extremism in Scotland: stakeholder perceptions and views

4. Views on extremism in Scotland

This section presents findings relating to participants’ views on extremism in Scotland. It covers participants’ views on the extent to which extremism is a problem in Scotland; whether the threat from extremism has changed over time; the threat posed by different types of extremism; geographic variations in the prevalence of extremism; and factors that may increase people’s vulnerability to being drawn into extremism.

While this section presents participants’ views on extremism in Scotland, the previous section highlighted that those who took part in this research had varied and wide-ranging interpretations of the term extremism. It is important to note, therefore, that the perspectives discussed in this section are not based on a common understanding or definition of extremism, and that the ways in which different participants interpret the concept are likely to impact on their views on its prevalence and severity in Scotland.

4.1. Extremism in Scotland

Participants generally felt that extremism exists in Scotland, but that it is not a particularly serious problem. Many drew comparisons with other parts of the UK, commenting that they viewed extremism as less of a concern in Scotland than in England in particular. There was a perception that both lower volumes of extremist activity, and less serious extremist activity, take place in Scotland.

‘I think we are pretty fortunate in terms of what we deal with extremism-wise compared to the rest of the UK, compared to England especially. They deal with more high-end extremism than we do.’ (Police sector participant)

‘I think in Scotland we have a different threat picture to England and Wales. We don’t deal with the same volume or seriousness of extremism as England.’ (Police sector participant)

Demographic factors were highlighted as one possible reason for this. In particular, participants viewed Scotland’s smaller population size as having potentially contributed to lower levels of extremism. Although many did not elaborate on why a link might exist between population size and extremism beyond noting that in a smaller population the total number of extremists is likely to be lower, it was highlighted that monitoring extremism could be more challenging among a larger population, which could mean there are more opportunities for extremism to grow. However, while some research has identified links between terrorism and high levels of population growth (in combination with income inequality and deprivation) (Coccia, 2018), there is little evidence that specifically indicates a link between population size and extremism.

Lower levels of immigration were also highlighted as a factor which may have contributed to the presence of less extremism in Scotland than England. Participants felt that because areas with higher levels of immigration are likely to be more ethnically diverse, there may be a higher prevalence of problems such as racism and discrimination. Participants believed that this could in turn create environments which are more permissive of extremist views.

‘I guess we don’t see the same sort of levels of immigration, particularly from ethnically more different areas, compared to England for example.’ (Health sector participant)

This point is reflected in the literature. For example, it has been demonstrated that high ethnic diversity is associated with more intergroup threat (Quilliam, 1995; Semyonov et al. 2004) and greater racial bias (Craig and Richeson, 2014); factors associated with willingness to engage in extremism (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Obaidi et al., 2019).

Participants also felt that higher levels of immigration can lead to the propagation of narratives which blame immigrants for domestic problems, creating support for more extreme viewpoints.

‘When there’s been a lot of immigration, sometimes a narrative is sown by other people who take advantage of that and try to say these groups are coming to take your jobs, to threaten your way of life. These lies are propagated and they play on people’s fears [...] it can bring extremism to the fore.’ (Faith and belief organisation participant)

Some therefore felt that if levels of immigration were more comparable between Scotland and England, the prevalence of extremism could be higher in Scotland than they currently perceive it to be.

‘I do see real issues, and you can see in the way that it’s reported, you know migrants coming across the Channel, you can see that in the attitude of those towards them, there is some real extreme views and it’s extreme views that don’t tend to be shared overtly by Scots, but maybe that’s because we don’t have the influx, and maybe if we were a port destination then maybe those views would surface.’ (Police sector participant)

Some participants also had a perception that levels of extremism are lower in Scotland due to a view that Scotland is more cohesive and tolerant than other parts of the UK. It was suggested that Scotland is more progressive and inclusive than other areas in Britain, which has reduced the appeal of extremist narratives in Scotland.

‘I think in Scotland we are pretty tolerant. We identify quite quickly and frown upon extreme views. We have a greater societal acceptance that we need immigration in order to survive as a country. The rhetoric on that is different down south. We haven’t got it right by any means, but I don’t think extremism is such a big issue in Scotland as it is in other parts of the UK, where they’ve got far more tensions arising within communities.’ (Local authority participant)

This argument is highlighted in the work of Bonino (2016), who has suggested that lower levels of Islamist extremism in Scotland can in part be explained by Scotland’s political culture and positive attitudes towards settled immigrants. Notably, however, other research has shown that despite a perception that there are more positive views towards immigration in Scotland than England, the proportion of people who view the economic and cultural consequences of immigration negatively is similar on both sides of the border (NatCen, 2018).

Indeed, some participants felt that while there is a perception that levels of extremism are lower in Scotland this is not evidenced-based, and that there is a lack of concrete data to determine the extent of the problem in Scotland. These participants felt that a result, Scotland should not view itself as immune to extremism.

‘We, collectively, Scots I suppose, we tend to have the impression of Scotland as an exceptional nation within the United Kingdom, that we’re friendlier, that we’re more open, and that we are less regressive, we’re more progressive… we sort of have that impression, but I’m not sure there are any metrics on that, that’s just the impression we have in Scotland, and that’s not a good way to make public policy.’ (Local authority participant)

‘The percentage per capita of referrals [to Prevent]^[8] is a lot lower, but that doesn’t fully tell us what’s going on at the moment. There could be a lot more extremism in Scotland [...] Scotland is no different to England and Wales, it’s not immune.’ (Government participant)

Overall, therefore, many participants felt that extremism exists in Scotland but is not a major problem, especially in comparison with other parts of the UK. However, some felt that the perception of extremism as less of a problem in Scotland is not evidence-based. The reflection that there is a lack of data and evidence regarding the extent of extremism in Scotland is discussed further in section 4.6 below.

4.2. Trends over time

Participants were asked to reflect on whether they perceive the threat from extremism in Scotland to have increased, decreased or stayed the same over the last five years. While no participants felt that the threat had decreased, participants had differing views on whether the threat had increased or stayed the same.

Many who felt that there was a chance extremism could have increased in Scotland over the last five years discussed the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants felt that during periods of lockdown people spent more time online, which is likely to have exposed them to greater extremist content. In particular, participants felt that during lockdown extremists promoted and spread conspiracy theories and misinformation online, and that people were more susceptible to these because of grievances arising from the pandemic-related public health measures imposed by governments.

Participants discussed how the spread of conspiracy theories and misinformation along with disrupted education, precarious employment and social isolation during the pandemic may have led to increased risks of radicalisation, particularly among younger people. These factors have all been discussed in recent literature on the subject (Cox et al., 2021).

‘I think [extremism] has increased and the reason I think it’s increased is because of the COVID pandemic. People who are the most vulnerable have been at home, online, looking at information, conspiracy theory type things. We’ve got a generation who basically have had two years of not living their life, so they have become anti-establishment.’ (Police sector participant)

Other contributory factors were also suggested, such as Brexit, which was viewed as having led to increased political polarisation, and the prevalence of mental illnesses having increased over time. However, although some research has sought to explore relevant features associated with particular conditions which may shape vulnerability and risk to extremism, the links between extremism and mental illness are not empirically well-established (Al-Attar, 2019).

Participants who felt that levels of extremism in Scotland were likely to be the same as five years ago mostly pointed to the fact that they were not aware of any evidence or data which indicates that they are growing. Indeed, some participants felt that they could not comment on whether levels of extremism have changed in Scotland because they were unaware of any relevant data or evidence on this, which is discussed further in section 4.6.

Participants were also asked to consider whether they feel that the threat from extremism in Scotland will increase, decrease or stay the same over the next five years. Many felt that the threat from extremism will increase over this period. A range of reasons for this were presented. Firstly, potential consequences of the current economic climate and cost of living crisis were mentioned, with many believing that economic insecurity and unemployment could increase people’s vulnerability to more extreme narratives by feeding societal divisions and encouraging ‘us versus them’ positions.

‘As people’s opportunity to earn what they need in order to live comfortably or even to survive recedes, they will gradually take more and more extreme responses to that. If you’re working really hard, living within the law and doing everything possible and you still cannot put food on the table and heat your house, at what point do you begin to get angry with somebody that you want to blame for those circumstances? I think we’ve got to assume that we’ll see a reaction to that, in terms of more extreme behaviour.’ (Local authority participant)

Some felt that there is a risk people may channel their frustration into blaming immigrants, which could in turn increase support for the far-right in particular.

‘There’s frustration at fuel prices, rising costs, people are wanting to blame somebody and they will blame immigrants. There’s the rhetoric that they are taking the houses, they’re getting all the benefits or they’re using taxpayers money [...] You’re going to see increases in that kind of far-right rhetoric.’ (Police sector participant)

Some also discussed the Scottish independence debate, and how a second referendum has the potential to lead to increased tension and polarisation.

‘If we are going for another referendum next October, the lead up to that would certainly polarise opinion and that polarisation I think always encourages extremism as well.’ (Police sector participant)

More broadly, divisive and populist politics were also discussed, with participants feeling that people in Scotland distrusting and feeling alienated from the UK Government could lead them to look for alternative, and potentially more extreme, political narratives. Finally, mental illnesses continuing to increase in prevalence was again mentioned as a potential factor which participants felt could lead to increased levels of extremism in Scotland in future, due a perception that mental illness can lead to vulnerability to radicalisation.

There were therefore differing views on whether levels of extremism have increased or stayed the same in Scotland over the last five years, but no participants felt that extremism has decreased over this period, and many felt that extremism will increase in the next five years.

4.3. Types of extremism

Right-wing extremism

Participants discussed their views on the types of extremism or ideologies they perceive to be more and less prevalent in Scotland. Many participants felt that right-wing extremism is the most prominent form of extremism in Scotland, and that its prevalence has increased in recent years. Two explanations were presented for this, though these focused more on reasons why right-wing extremism may have increased across the UK as a whole rather than in Scotland specifically.

Firstly, some felt that there has been an increase in the prominence of extreme right-wing groups in the UK in response to Islamist terrorist attacks which have taken place in recent years, such as the 2017 Westminster attack.

‘I think there’s a possibility that it’s the aftereffects of Islam-based attacks taking place in the UK probably between 2017/18 even going into 2020 when you got the Westminster Bridge attack, stuff like that. I think there’s a young impressionable part of the population that think it’s their duty to stand up and fight against that.’ (Police sector participant)

Secondly, some felt that immigration policies which have been advocated by the UK Government, such as the Home Office hostile environment policy and the policy to send asylum seekers to Rwanda, have focused media and public attention on issues associated with immigration and in the process, given exposure to far-right viewpoints in the UK.

‘One of the main things for me, when you look at how right-wing the government has been in Westminster, this extraordinary one of sending people to Rwanda… That sort of galvanises and encourages support for particularly racist points of view.’ (Police sector participant)

Contrary to this viewpoint, there is some academic evidence to suggest that the absence of representation of such views within mainstream politics may increase support for more radical-right parties, such as UKIP (Ford and Goodwin, 2014).

Other participants felt that right-wing extremism is not a particular concern in Scotland, particularly in comparison with other parts of the UK. For example, some felt that the extreme right-wing are less organised in Scotland than in England. This related to the perception noted above that Scotland is more cohesive and tolerant than other parts of the UK, which participants felt has led to Scotland being less permissive of extreme right-wing viewpoints.

‘One thing I’m really pleased about is that the right-wing doesn’t do as well as it could because it can’t organise properly in Scotland. If it could organise properly then it would be a bigger threat.’ (Local authority participant)

As noted above, however, there is research which has suggested that views on policy issues such as immigration could be similar between Scotland and England (NatCen, 2018).

Sectarianism

Research previously carried out by the Scottish Government (2015) highlighted that pockets of intra-Christian sectarianism exist in Scotland, with more violent and extreme forms concentrated in particular areas. While not all participants considered sectarianism to be a form of extremism, those who did highlighted intra-Christian sectarianism as a prominent type of extremism in Scotland. Indeed, many felt that this is the most prevalent form of extremism to exist in Scotland. These participants held a view that intra-Christian sectarianism is a normalised and tolerated form of extremism, which leads to it being treated differently to other types.

‘[Sectarianism] is the only ideology that is accepted by the State and supported by the State; we don’t see the State supporting Islamic extremism but you’ve got Catholic and Protestant schools, you’ve got Orange Walks allowed to take place [...] all that based upon freedom of expressing your culture. It has to be called out for what it is rather than viewed as a cultural aspect of Scotland.’ (Other private/third sector participant)

However, some commented that they may view it as the most prevalent because it is the most visible form of extremism in Scotland. For example, some participants noted that it is more common to witness incidents of intra-Christian sectarianism than it is to witness right-wing or Islamist extremism.

Many also highlighted that the concept of sectarianism is broader than intra-Christian sectarianism alone. It was felt that while the focus in Scotland is often on the tension between Catholics and Protestants, other forms of sectarianism also exist, such as within the Muslim community. The murder of Asad Shah, an Ahmadiyya Muslim shopkeeper who was attacked in Glasgow in 2016 by a Sunni Muslim because of his religious views, was highlighted as an example of intra-Muslim sectarianism in Scotland, though several noted that the perpetrator had travelled from elsewhere in the UK.

‘We often view sectarianism in Scotland as just being about Protestant and Catholics but of course there’s sectarianism between Islamic groups too. There was the murder of the shopkeeper in Glasgow, Asad Shah, that was religiously motivated.’ (Faith and belief organisation participant)

Islamist extremism

Participants generally felt that Islamist extremism is less prominent in Scotland than it is in other parts of the UK. The demographic profile of the Muslim community in Scotland was highlighted as a potential reason for this, with some participants feeling that the Muslim population is smaller and more integrated in Scotland than it is in England, which may have lessened the appeal of Islamist extremist narratives.

‘The Islamist ideology I think is an area for concern in other parts of the UK. It’s not something we see much of up here, not that I’m aware of anyway. I think in England in particular there are big communities that have perhaps not integrated well. That creates challenges. Whereas in Scotland the community is smaller, and very well integrated.’ (Health sector participant)

This argument is also reflected in the literature, with Bonino (2016) arguing that greater community cohesion in Scotland may have reduced the impact of ‘grievance-based jihadi propaganda’. Steps that the Muslim community in Scotland took in response to high-profile Islamist terrorist incidents elsewhere in the UK were also highlighted, such as expanding religious syllabuses beyond reading the Quran.

‘There’s actually very little [Islamist extremism] and in terms of that, you’ve got to look at how the [Muslim] community in Scotland upped its game and stepped forward when there was [sic] events like 9/11 and 7/7 [...] A key part of that was ensuring people were literate about their religion. When we saw what people were doing in the name of their religion we thought, “Right, we need to change” and the mosque leaders were actively part of that change and started to teach more to children than just reading the Quran.’ (Faith and belief organisation participant)

Extremism and the Scottish independence debate

Some participants also discussed extremism and the debate on Scottish independence. As noted above, some felt that this had potential to lead to increased tension and polarisation.

‘If there is another independence referendum which leads to a narrow defeat, you’ve got a perfect environment for breeding extremism because you have got a very, very sizable minority who are frustrated.’ (Local authority participant)

Newly emerging concerns

Finally, some participants discussed extremism-related concerns that they feel are emerging in Scotland, such as the incel movement. The case of Gabrielle Friel, who was found guilty of terrorism charges in 2020, was mentioned. Friel was accused of having expressed affinity with and sympathy for one incel-motivated mass murderer (Police Scotland, 2021). However, while Friel was found guilty of possessing weapons for purposes connected to an act of terrorism, the jury returned a verdict of ‘not proven’ in respect of the charge that he prepared for terrorist acts by researching spree killings connected with incels.

Forms of extremism relating to gender and reproductive rights more broadly were also highlighted as potential future concerns, with some highlighting anti-abortion protests that had taken place outside Scottish hospitals and clinics in the summer of 2022 as behaviour that could be considered extremist.

‘There is the potential for [extremism relating to] human reproductive rights as well. I think the debate about abortion could take extremist terms, if it hasn’t already. I’m not sure that picketing an abortion clinic isn’t an extremist act… I’m pretty sure it is.’ (Education sector participant)

There was also discussion of disruptive climate activism, and how this has increased in prominence in recent years. Some felt that forms of climate protest can be problematic, such as blocking roads or damaging infrastructure. However, many were hesitant to label this behaviour as extreme due to their support for the cause. Indeed, difficulties with drawing a line between activism and extremism were often discussed, with some suggesting that a line is crossed when the behaviour puts others at harm.

‘We have got to stop talking about climate action in the same breath as extremism. It’s not the same thing. It’s activism. But maybe there is a question there, what is the difference between activism and extremism? Maybe it’s part of a spectrum […] there’s nothing wrong with activism until your activism is to promote direct action which could harm others.’ (Local authority participant)

Overall, therefore, participants generally felt that the types of extremism that are more and less prevalent in Scotland differ compared with other parts of the UK, with right-wing and sectarian forms of extremism the most prevalent, and Islamist extremism less of a problem.

4.4. Geographic variation

Participants discussed their views on whether the prevalence of extremism in Scotland varies by geographic region. Some participants felt that extremism is more likely to be a problem in urban parts of Scotland than in rural parts. Different reasons were presented for this. In line with points discussed above, some felt that urban areas are more likely to experience higher levels of immigration, which could lead to the existence of prejudiced viewpoints.

‘In the large city centres where they’ve experienced more immigration there might be more prejudiced views, views like “why are these people coming in and stealing our jobs or threatening or way of life?” There’s certainly an element of that.’ (Faith and belief organisation participant)

A larger population size in urban areas was again raised as a potential factor that may lead to higher levels of extremism, although as noted above there is little evidence which indicates a direct causal link between population size and extremism in academic literature.

Other participants felt that extremism is likely to be a problem in rural areas of Scotland as well as urban areas. In contrast to the points made above, these participants felt that lower levels of ethnic diversity in rural areas could increase the likelihood of extremism due to the lack of exposure to, or interactions with, people from other ethnic groups, leading to more bias and discrimination.

‘I suspect that bigotry will be much more engendered in some of the more rural parts of Scotland. I suspect that racism in [rural areas] is much more rife than it would be in Glasgow or Birmingham because the proportion of the population from a black, Asian or minority ethnic background is very small.’ (Education sector participant)

‘[In urban areas] there’s the constant encounter with the other, people have their neighbours, their kids in schools. There’s Melā and multifaith celebrations and that kind of stuff. In some of the rural areas, there may be more of a feel of the other because there isn’t that same multiculturalism.’ (Faith and belief organisation participant)

This point is also supported by literature. For example, Oliver and Wong (2003) found that ethnic diversity can be associated with less prejudice in neighbourhoods, while Van Assche et al. (2014) showed that ethnic diversity can be associated with more positive attitudes towards outgroup members such as immigrants. Participants also felt that levels of isolation and loneliness may be higher in rural areas, which could increase vulnerability to extremism (reasons suggested for this are discussed further in section 4.5).

Though there were differing views on whether extremism is more likely to be a problem in urban or rural areas, some felt that geography is now less relevant due to the increasing ease with which people can communicate with others and access content online. These participants discussed how virtual communication now means that people can be radicalised without leaving their home.

‘Extremism now can take place anywhere with an internet connection [...] Geography is less important nowadays when you’ve got the internet linking the whole world up.’ (Police sector participant)

Indeed, a number of studies have pointed to the internet’s ability to ‘reach’ individuals who would otherwise not have been reachable by extremists in any other way (Neuman, 2008).

As well as discussing geographic variation in levels of extremism more broadly, participants also reflected on whether the prevalence of particular ideologies or types of extremism may vary by region of Scotland. The main ‘type’ of extremism that was raised in these discussions was intra-Christian sectarianism. While not all participants felt that sectarianism was a form of extremism, those who did often considered that this was most prevalent in the west of Scotland, and in particular Glasgow.

‘Glasgow and to the western side of the Central Belt is where sectarian perspectives are most problematic.’ (Health sector participant)

However, others felt that while Glasgow is the focal point of sectarianism due to particular football clubs being based in the city, there are people with sectarian attitudes and viewpoints across the country.

‘I hate the stereotype that sectarianism is a Glasgow problem because it’s not a Glasgow problem, it’s a Scotland problem. The history of sectarianism is a Scotland-wide issue. Glasgow is the epicentre because the football clubs [Celtic and Rangers] are located in Glasgow.’ (Local authority participant)

Extreme views relating to Scottish nationalism were also mentioned in discussions around geographic variation, with some feeling that there is a chance these could be more prevalent in parts of the north of Scotland and in rural areas due to higher levels of anti-UK government sentiment in these areas than other parts of Scotland.

‘I think in the north there’s probably kind of an undercurrent of nationalism, anti-English, anti-UK. You look at what was done to those groups in the highland clearances and things like that, sometimes these areas can be a bit more anti-establishment.’ (Police sector participant)

There were therefore mixed views regarding the geographic distribution of extremism in Scotland. Some felt that extremism was more likely to be a problem in urban areas, but others highlighted reasons why extremism may also be a problem in rural parts of Scotland. Intra-Christian sectarianism was viewed as a more prevalent concern in the west of Scotland and in particular Glasgow (though some participants disagreed with this), while some felt extreme views relating to Scottish nationalism could be more prevalent in the north and rural areas.

Notably, throughout these discussions many participants qualified their views by saying that they were largely anecdotal, and not based on concrete data or evidence, an issue which is covered in more detail in section 4.6.

4.5. Factors that make people vulnerable to extremism

Participants discussed a range of factors they felt might make someone vulnerable to being drawn into extremism. The factors mentioned were highly interconnected, with an individual being affected by one factor (e.g., negative familial relationships) often increasing their likelihood of being affected by another (e.g., loneliness).

The most common factor discussed by participants was isolation. It was felt that those who are isolated or lonely may have a desire for belonging or purpose, which may draw them towards groups espousing extremist viewpoints.

‘That sense of purpose, if people don’t have anything to get up for in the morning, there’s nothing that defines them as an individual. If someone can start subtly introducing them to things that give them that sense of purpose, they feel like they’re part of something bigger… and that’s problematic.’ (Health sector participant)

In addition, some felt that those who are isolated may have a lack of counter-narrative from their family or peers, which may lead to existing grievances or views becoming further entrenched.

‘I think probably quite a significant factor is that people spending time alone are only getting one dimension of information. They’re not having anybody, whether it’s a friend or a parent, or a social worker or teacher, countering whatever rhetoric they're getting. It’s making it really kind of quite compounded for that individual.’ (Police sector participant)

Research has demonstrated associations between social isolation, loneliness and vulnerability to extremism (Bhui et al., 2014; Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015; Pfundmair et al., 2022). For example, a review of international evidence carried out by Pfundmair et al. (2022) found that social exclusion can increase approval of extreme and violent political parties and actions, and willingness to engage in illegal and violent action for a political cause.

Mental illness was also discussed. For example, some held the view that addiction and having suffered trauma could make someone vulnerable to extremism. However, some commented that they felt there was a lack of research demonstrating links between mental illnesses and vulnerability to extremism. As highlighted above, at present the nature of the relationship between mental illness and engagement in extremism remains largely unclear (Bhuai and Jones, 2017; McGilloway et al., 2015).

Some participants mentioned neurodivergence as a possible factor that might make someone vulnerable to extremist ideologies. These participants specifically discussed autism, expressing the view that some autistic people might be more susceptible to radicalisation, for example due to a perceived tendency to develop obsessional interests. However, while there is some research which has shown that autistic people have engaged in extremist-related violent acts (Woodbury-Smith et al., 2022), there is no empirical evidence indicating a causal link between autism and extremism (Al-Attar, 2018; Faccini and Allely, 2017; Worthington et al., 2022). Indeed, many have highlighted the importance of exercising caution against drawing conclusions of causality and oversimplifying the relationship between autism and extremism (Al-Attar, 2020). For example, Al-Attar (2020) notes that while studies have suggested an overrepresentation of autistic people among terrorist offenders as compared with the general population (Corner and Gill, 2015; Corner et al., 2016), there is no evidence to indicate that autism plays a causal role. Al-Attar (2020) suggests that rather, different aspects of autism may interact to contextualise factors that lead an individual to engage in extremism. He suggests that an ‘individualised case formulation’ approach should be used when considering such factors, taking account of the diversity and heterogeneity of autism and the role of co-morbidity in an individual’s pathway.

Spending a lot of time online was also highlighted as a risk factor by some participants, with the internet viewed as providing opportunities for extremists to target, connect and communicate with people vulnerable to radicalisation. As noted above, it was felt that this risk had increased as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, as during this time people may have spent more time alone and on the internet, particularly younger groups.

Participants also discussed individuals feeling that they are unable to fulfil their potential or having a lack of opportunities as factors which could make them vulnerable to extremism. They often linked this with problems such as poverty, socioeconomic deprivation, unemployment and poor educational attainment.

‘It’s linked to socioeconomic deprivation. If people are disaffected and don’t feel direct engagement with society, they’re more likely to tip into extremist behaviour because they don’t have an invested stake in the values of the society that they feel has let them down.’ (Education sector participant)

More specifically, as discussed above some felt that this could create a sense of injustice which could in turn lead individuals to be influenced by extremist narratives, such as placing blame on immigrants.

‘It comes down to socioeconomic factors, people who are feeling disadvantaged and looking for a scapegoat.’ (Faith and belief sector participant)

An individual’s family environment was also thought to affect their vulnerability to extremism. While this was mostly discussed in relation to a lack of counter-narrative as mentioned above, some also felt that family members could encourage individuals towards extremism if they themselves held extremist views. Demographic characteristics were also felt to be important, with some viewing young males as more likely to be vulnerable to extremism than other groups.

Participants therefore highlighted a range of factors they felt could make people vulnerable to extremism, most notably isolation and loneliness; mental illness; neurodivergence; spending time online; family background; lack of opportunities; and particular demographic characteristics. Some also felt that the factors that may make someone vulnerable to extremism can be dependent on the ideology or type of extremism in question. For example, it was mentioned that affiliation with the incel community may be associated with specific risk factors, including holding misogynistic views and feeling sexual and romantic frustration.

4.6. Improving data

As noted throughout this section, a key theme that emerged during discussions about extremism in Scotland was participants’ reflections that their views were not based on data or evidence but rather were more anecdotal. Participants often qualified statements by noting that they were unsure if there was evidence or research underpinning their view.

‘That is my sense, but I don’t have any evidence to back that up.’ (Local authority participant)

‘I think there’s probably more right-wing extremism in some of the rural areas but I have no evidence for this. It’s very difficult to really know, isn’t it?’ (Faith and belief organisation participant)

Further, some specifically commented that there is currently a lack of robust information regarding the extent of extremism in Scotland. Potential reasons for this were noted. For example, participants acknowledged that it can be difficult to measure extremism because it is often covert and hidden.

‘The latent number of people who are immersed in extremist ideologies, who are planning terrorist attacks, we’ll never know what that is really. It’s incredibly difficult to measure.’ (Local authority sector participant)

It was also felt that sharing of information regarding extremist activity taking place in Scotland was limited, for example between Police Scotland and other organisations (discussed further in section 5.3). While participants understood that this was due to potential security risks associated with sharing such information widely, it was felt that this hindered understanding of extremism in Scotland.

This argument is reflected in wider literature. For example, Knight and Keatley (2020) discuss how data on extremist and terrorist activity is rarely available in the public domain due to its sensitive nature, and note how processes in place to protect individuals can create obstacles for data sharing.

More specifically, some participants also felt that there is a lack of understanding at present regarding the impact the COVID-19 pandemic may have had on levels of engagement with extremism in Scotland. It was noted that referrals to Prevent decreased during the pandemic (between April 2020 and March 2021 55 referrals were made to Prevent in Scotland compared with 100 in the previous year and 126 in the year prior) (Police Scotland, 2023b). However, participants felt that this was unlikely to reflect a decrease in extremist activity, commenting that COVID-19 may have in fact increased levels of extremism for reasons discussed above. However, in the absence of other sources of information, participants felt that it is currently difficult to tell whether the pandemic impacted on levels of extremism in Scotland or not.

‘It’s difficult to say [whether COVID has impacted levels of extremism in Scotland] isn’t it, there were so few referrals [to Prevent] during that time that it was difficult to tell what was going on.’ (Local authority participant)

Many participants were therefore supportive of more research being carried out on this topic and had a desire for improvements to be made to the collection of data on extremism in Scotland, as well as wider sharing of existing data where possible.

4.7. Summary

Many participants felt that while extremism exists in Scotland its prevalence is not high, particularly in comparison with England. However, some did not feel that there was enough evidence to determine the extent to which extremism is a problem in Scotland, and that Scotland should therefore not view itself as immune to extremism. There was a perception that the types of extremism that are more and less prevalent in Scotland differs to other parts of the UK, with right-wing and sectarian forms of extremism the most prevalent, and Islamist extremism less of a concern than it is in other areas of Britain.

While views on whether levels of extremism have changed in Scotland over the last five years varied, many felt that they would increase in the next five years, and no participants felt they had decreased. Some felt that extremism is more likely to be a problem in urban areas of Scotland, while others highlighted reasons why extremism could be prevalent in rural areas too. Intra-Christian sectarianism was viewed as more of a concern in the west of Scotland and in particular in Glasgow.

Participants identified a range of factors that they thought might make people vulnerable to being drawn into extremism, including isolation and loneliness, mental illness, neurodivergence, spending time online, family background, lack of opportunities and particular demographic characteristics.

Throughout discussions, many participants highlighted that their views were often not based on fact or evidence but rather were more speculative or anecdotal. There was support for further developing the evidence-base on extremism in Scotland.