Review of emerging technologies in policing: findings and recommendations

Appendix 3: UK Case Law Plain Text

Citation AS1's (A Child) Application for Judicial Review, Re [2021] NIQB 11

Topic Retention of data (video footage)

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues Video footage taken by police of a search which captured images of a child in his home.

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• Search conducted lawfully under terrorism legislation
• Data lawfully retained in accordance with the Police Service of Northern Ireland's policy.
• The footage had been relevant to possible criminal charges, a complaint to the Police Ombudsman and potential civil litigation and therefore met the test for retention

Citation BC and Others v Iain Livingstone QPM, Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland and Others, [2020] CSIH 61

Topic Queries the nature and scope of a common law right to privacy in Scotland similar in scope to the Article 8 ECHR right to privacy.

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues Petitioners were seeking a declarator that the respondents’ use of messages sent to, from and amongst the reclaimers in private “WhatsApp” electronic message groups (“the Messages”) to bring misconduct proceedings against them in respect of allegations of non-criminal behaviour was unlawful et separatism incompatible with their ECHR article 8 rights

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• Lady Dorrian at para 83 “The existence in Scotland of an obligation of confidence has long been recognised, and here too the need for a confidential relationship has given way to a focus on the knowledge of those possessing the information that it had been imparted in confidence (Lord Advocate v Scotsman Publications 1988 SLT 490). I see no reason to think that the effect of articles 8 and 10 in respect of this area of the law in Scotland is any different to that in England, but it does not mean that there has thereby been created a widely applicable general right of privacy”

Citation Excession Technologies Ltd v Police Digital Service 2022 WL 00597263

Topic Procurement process for computer and information systems.

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues Addressed the procurement process applicable to the appointment of a contractor to a framework agreement for the provision of computer and information technology services in respect of a covert surveillance operation room.

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• PDS was entitled to rely on the exemption under regulation 7(1)(b) of Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011 in relation to the Procurement

Citation HMA v Purves 2009 S.L.T. 969

Topic Validity of authorisation of directed surveillance by electronic means.

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues An accused was charged with being concerned in the supply of controlled drugs. At a preliminary hearing, the accused lodged a minute against the admissibility of certain evidence which had been obtained by directed surveillance, authorisation for which had been granted by a An accused was charged with being concerned in the supply of controlled drugs. At a preliminary hearing, the accused lodged a minute against the admissibility of certain evidence which had been obtained by directed surveillance, authorisation for which had been granted by a police superintendent in terms of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 via a secure online system. The accused submitted that the authorisation was invalid as it was not a written document as required by s 19(1)(b) of the 2000 Act and failed to bear the superintendent's signature.

Appellants detained under s14 CPSA 1995.

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• Held that authorisation of directed surveillance via an secure online system met with the requirements that authorisation be in writing in terms of s19(1)(b) Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000.

Citation L v HM Advocate [2014] HCJAC 35

Topic Admissibility of evidence obtained from interrogation of phone (following detention).

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues Phone taken from one appellant and interrogated.

Appellants were charged with assault to injury and permanent disfigurement.

Preliminary issue raised re admissibility of evidence.

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• Held that since the nothing more had to be done other than connect the device to a power source and touching portions of the screen this fell within the scope of a s14(7)CPSA1995 examination.
• There was some suggestion in the case that the position may be different where the device was internet enabled and linked to social media accounts suggesting that examination of those accounts may or may not fall within the scope of s14(7) depending on the security settings of those accounts.

Citation R (on the application of Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales [2020] EWCA Civ 1058

Topic Trial of automated facial recognition software.

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues N/A Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

Held,

• That in determining whether an interference with the rights guaranteed under article 8 of the Human Rights Convention was “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of article 8.2 , a relativist approach was to be adopted,
• The more intrusive the act complained of, the more precise and specific the law said to justify it was required to be;
• The interference complained of in the present case was not analogous to the taking of photographs or the use of CCTV cameras by the police but, rather, fell somewhere in between the two poles on a spectrum ranging from, on the one hand, the storing of photographs and intelligence notes on a database and, on the other hand, the retention of fingerprint and DNA samples; that, in particular it was relevant that (i) AFR was a novel technology, (ii) it involved the capture of images and processing of digital information of a large number of members of the public, the vast majority of whom were unlikely to be of interest to the police, (iii) the data concerned was “sensitive personal data” within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 2018 and (iv) the data was processed in an automated way;
• The framework governing the use of AFR by the defendant's police force, which comprised the 2018 Act, the Secretary of State's Surveillance Camera Code and the policy documents of the defendant's police force, was insufficient to constitute the “law” for the purposes of article 8.2 , since all that was required under that framework was that there had to be a proper law enforcement purpose and the deployment of AFR Locate had to be considered necessary to achieve that purpose; that that left two impermissibly wide areas of discretion outside the scope of the governing framework, namely (i) the selection of those individuals who would be included on watch lists when AFR Locate was being deployed and (ii) the locations where AFR Locate might be deployed, for which no normative requirement was laid down;
• The interference with article 8 rights occasioned by the police force's past and continuing use of AFR Locate could not be justified under article 8.2.
• That in light of the finding that the use of AFR Locate was not “in accordance with the law” for the purposes of article 8.2 , the inevitable consequence was that, notwithstanding the attempt of the data protection impact assessment to grapple with the article 8 issues, it had failed properly to assess the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects and the measures envisaged to address the risks arising from the deficiencies, as required by section 64(3)(b) and (c) of the 2018 Act, because it had proceeded on the basis that article 8 had not been infringed
• That although the public sector equality duty in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 was a duty of process and not outcome, that did not diminish its importance since good processes were more likely to lead to better informed, and therefore better, decisions, and helped to make public authorities accountable to the public;
• That the public sector equality duty, which was dependent on the context, required a public authority to take reasonable steps to make enquiries about what might not yet be known to it about the potential impact of a proposed decision or policy on people with the relevant characteristics, in particular for present purposes, race and sex; that whilst there was no evidence that AFR had any bias on racial or gender grounds, the whole purpose of the positive duty (as opposed to the negative duties in the 2010 Act) was to ensure that a public authority did not inadvertently overlook information which it ought to take into account;
• That before or during the course of a trial process it was all the more important for a public authority to acquire relevant information in order to conform to that duty and, in particular, to avoid indirect discrimination on racial or gender grounds;
• That in the present case, the defendant's police force had never sought to satisfy themselves, either directly or by way of independent verification, that the software program did not have an unacceptable bias on grounds of race or sex; and that, accordingly, the police force had not done all that it reasonably could, prior to or in the course of its use of AFR Locate and on an ongoing basis, to discharge its non-delegable duty under section 149 of the 2010 Act (post, paras 176, 179–182, 199–201, 210). R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] 1 WLR 3213 , CA, R (Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening) [2014] Eq LR 60 , CA and Hotak v Southwark London Borough Council [2016] AC 811 , SC(E) applied.
• Where a general measure is challenged on article 8 grounds, it is appropriate for the court, when determining whether the interference with the article 8 right is proportionate, to assess the balance between the impact on every person who is affected by the measure and the interests of the community. Where, however, the substance of the challenge is not a general measure but a very specific deployment of a measure on a particular occasion against a particular individual such a wide assessment is not appropriate (post, paras 140–143).

Citation R. (on the application of Business Energy Solutions Ltd) v Preston Crown Court [2018] EWHC 1534 (Admin)

Topic Scope and applicability of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 in relation to the requirement to return copied data (that had been copied from seized devices).

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues N/A

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

Held,

• Copied data is subject to a duty of return (as seized property). The Crown Court could instruct is destruction (subject to considerations of ‘reasonable practicability’.
• The reasonable practicability of separation test in section 53 of the 2001 Act, was not confined to physical or technical considerations which, while they might play a part in the analysis, were by no means the only criteria for assessment; that, having applied the correct test, the judge had been best placed to form a conclusion about the dispute before him and had been entitled to accept the authority's submissions that in order to comply with the claimants’ request it would have been required to divert very substantial human and manual resources to the task.

Citation R (on the application of C) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2012] EWHC 1681 (Admin

Topic Retention of custody photographs (where charges are not pursued).

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues N/A

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• Acknowledged that the retention of such photographs was a violation of Article 8(1) and that while s64A Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was ‘too broad and imprecise’ taken together with the Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information and the Management of Police Information Guidance there was a clear and detailed framework governing the exercise of the discretion that ensured such retention was in accordance with the law.

Citation R (on the application of Catt) v Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland [2015] UKSC 9

Topic Judicial review proceedings in respect of data retention provisions relating to a “domestic extremism” database maintained by the National Public Order Intelligence Unit and separately the retention of warning notices.

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues N/A

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

Held,

• That the state's systematic collection and storage in retrievable form of public information about an individual was an interference with private life such as to engage article 8.1 of the Convention and so required to be “in accordance with the law” within article 8.2 ; that such term was not limited to requiring an ascertainable legal basis for the interference as a matter of domestic law, but also ensured that the law was not so wide or indefinite as to permit interference with the right on an arbitrary or abusive basis; that, for that purpose, the rules in question did not need to be statutory, provided that they operated within a framework of law and that there were effective means of enforcing them, and provided that their application, including the manner in which any discretion would be exercised, was reasonably predictable, if necessary with the assistance of expert advice; that the retention of data in police information systems in the United Kingdom, being subject to the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 and to published administrative codes of practice issued pursuant to section 39A of the Police Act 1996 , as inserted, was in accordance with the law; and that, accordingly, that pre-condition having been met, the question was whether the collection and storage of the data in relation to the claimants in each case was proportionate to its objective of securing public safety or preventing disorder or crime, so as to be justifiable (post, paras 4, 6, 11-13, 17, 47-50, 58, 60).
• Allowing the appeal in the first case (Lord Toulson JSC dissenting), that the retention of data recording information relating to attendees of political protest meetings served a proper policing purpose (namely, of enabling the police to make a more informed assessment of the risks and the threats to public order associated with demonstrations forming part of an identifiable campaign and of the scale and nature of the police response which might be necessary in future, to investigate criminal offences where there had been any, to identify potential witnesses and victims, and to study the leadership, organisation, tactics and methods of protest groups which had been persistently associated with violence, and other protest groups associated with them); that the fact that some of the information recorded in the database related to attendees who had not committed and were not likely to commit offences did not make it irrelevant for legitimate policing purposes but rather could be of importance not only for the prevention and detection of crime associated with public demonstrations, but to enable the great majority of public demonstrations which were peaceful and lawful to take place without incident and without an overbearing police presence; and that, accordingly, the police had shown that the retention of data in nominal records of other persons about the claimant's participation in demonstrations, albeit amounting to a minor interference with his right to private life, was justified under article 8.2 by the legitimate requirements of police intelligence-gathering in the interests of the maintenance of public order and the prevention of crime (post, paras 7, 25-26, 29-31, 34, 35, 52, 56, 57-58, 60).
• Allowing the appeal in the second case, that a harassment letter issued pursuant to the Prevention of Harassment Act 1997 was intended to warn the recipient that some conduct on his or her part might, if repeated, constitute an offence and thus prevent the recipient from denying that he or she knew that it might amount to harassment, and as such served a legitimate policing function of preventing crime or bringing an accused to justice; that (Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord Sumption JSC dissenting in part) the standard practice of retaining material relating to potential harassment cases for seven or 12 years was proportionate, provided that it was flexible enough to allow for deletion when the information was no longer required; and that, accordingly, since the material relating to the claimant had been deleted after a few years when it was no longer required, the Court of Appeal had erred in finding its retention to be a disproportionate interference with her right to private life (post, paras 42, 44, 46, 54-56, 57, 59, 60, 76-77).

Citation R. (on the application of II) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2020] EWHC 2528 (Admin)

Topic Retention of data

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues 11 year old referred through prevent strategy.

Personal data retained.

Age 16 – challenging continued retention.

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• Breached his Article 8 right to private and family life and the Data Protection Act 2018 s35 and s39.
• Importantly it was held that a proportionality assessment under Article 8 would determine whether retention was “necessary” within the meaning of s35(2)(b) and s39(1) DPA 2018.

Citation R (on the application of M) v The Chief Constable of Sussex Police, Brighton & Hove [2021] EWCA Civ 42

Topic Scope and application of Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018.

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues Claim for judicial review fell into two parts. The first was a challenge to the lawfulness of the Respondent's safeguards for disclosing sensitive personal data to the Brighton & Hove Business Crime Reduction Partnership ("the BCRP") under an Information Sharing Agreement made in December 2018 ("ISA 2018"). The second part of the claim was a discrete complaint about the unlawfulness of specific past disclosures of M's personal data, including sensitive personal data, allegedly made by the Respondent to the BCRP.

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• It found “what matters for the purposes of demonstrating compliance with section 42(2) of the DPA 2018 is the substance of the policy document relied on, and whether in circumstances where the data to be processed is or might be characterised as "special category" or "sensitive" data (as the case may be), the document (a) explains the controller's procedures for securing compliance with the data protection principles in respect of such data, and (b) explains the controller's policies as regards the retention and erasure of such data.”

Citation R (on the application of Miller) v College of Policing [2021] EWCA Civ 1926

Topic Recording of perception-based hate crime and Data Protection Act 2018.

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues Concerned perception-based recording of hate crime and the lawfulness of Hate Crime Operational Guidance.

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• Affirmed that “no statutory authorisation is necessary in relation to non-intrusive methods of data collection, even where the gathering and retention of that data interferes with Convention rights”.^[1] That being said, it acknowledged that there would still be an obligation to abide by the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Human Rights Act 1998.

Citation R (on the application of the National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWHC 2057 (Admin)

Topic Data retention following Investigatory Powers Act 2016 warrants.

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues Judicial review proceedings seeking a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 2 in respect of "Bulk interception warrants", "bulk equipment interference warrants", "thematic equipment interference warrants", "bulk personal dataset warrants", "bulk acquisition warrants" and the power to authorise any officer of the authority to obtain or retain communication data granted in terms of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

Held, dismissing the claim,

• That the question of compatibility with the Convention was to be determined by reference to the totality of the interlocking safeguards applicable at the various stages of the bulk interception process, rather than by reference to the potential breadth of the information that could in principle be retained under the bulk interception power;
• That the safeguards relevant to bulk interception warrants under Chapter I of Part 6 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 included:

  (i) the requirement that the Secretary of State could only issue such a warrant if he considered that it was necessary on one of the statutory grounds and that the conduct authorised by it was proportionate to what was sought to be achieved,

  (ii) the requirement for approval by a judicial commissioner,

  (iii) the requirement that a warrant application contain a description of the communications to be intercepted,

  (iv) the narrowness of the definition of "overseas-related communications" which could be intercepted,

  (v) the requirement that a warrant specify the operational purposes for which any intercepted content or secondary data obtained under the warrant might be selected for examination,

  (vi) the powers given to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to oversee the whole interception process and

  (vii) the fact that it was open to a person to complain or bring a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal;

• That those safeguards were sufficient to prevent the risk of abuse of discretionary power and so met the requirement in articles 8.2 and 10.2 of the Convention respectively that any interference with Convention rights was "in accordance with the law" and "prescribed by law";
• That, likewise, the safeguards that applied to bulk and thematic equipment interference warrants under Part 5 and Chapter 3 of Part 6 of the 2016 Act, bulk personal dataset warrants under Part 7 of the 2016 Act and bulk acquisition warrants under Chapter 2 of Part 6 of the 2016 Act, many of which were the same as or similar to those which applied to bulk interception warrants, were sufficient to meet the requirements of articles 8.2 and 10.2 ;
• And that, in light of the fact that the powers under Parts 3 and 4 of the 2016 Act were subject to the necessity and proportionality tests and, where necessary, were subject to approval by a judicial commissioner or the Office for Communications Data, it could not be said that the purposes for which those powers could be exercised was too wide or arbitrary, or that Parts 3 and 4 were incompatible with the Convention rights on any other ground
• That when deciding whether to exercise powers relating to warrants and authorisations under Parts 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the 2016 Act a public authority was required under section 2(2)(b) to have regard to whether the level of protection to be applied in relation to any obtaining of information by virtue of the warrant or authorisation was higher because of the particular sensitivity of that information;
• That, further, by virtue of section 2(5)(a) "sensitive information" included items subject to legal privilege; that, therefore, the need to treat legally privileged items as sensitive was a principle which suffused the entire regime in the 2016 Act; That Parts 5 and Chapters 1 and 3 of Part 6 of the Act also contained a wide range of dedicated and detailed safeguards for legally privileged items;
• That although those additional safeguards did not apply to all types of data, and no specific safeguards applied to the bulk acquisition of communications data, the general privacy duties in section 2 and the relevant parts of the code of practice nevertheless applied;
• That neither Strasbourg nor domestic jurisprudence lay down a general requirement for prior independent authorisation of interference with lawyer-client communications in order to achieve compatibility with article 8 ;
• And that, accordingly, the rules regarding legally privileged items were set out in the 2016 Act and codes of practice with sufficient clarity and with sufficient safeguards so as to avoid arbitrary interference and so as to render the statutory scheme compatible with article 8 of the Convention.
• That since by section 2(5)(b) of the 2016 Act "sensitive information" included any information identifying or confirming a source of journalistic information, section 2 also protected confidential journalistic material; that, moreover, additional safeguards applied in the case of a targeted warrant for interception or examination, requiring prior approval by a judicial commissioner (or any other person independent of the executive) and consideration of questions of necessity and proportionality;
• That although bulk warrants under Part 6 of the 2016 were not subject to similar safeguards, there was no requirement under the Convention for prior independent authorisation where information was obtained in bulk and was then searched in order to identify a source or to obtain journalistic material; and that, accordingly, the provisions of the 2016 Act were not incompatible with article 10 of the Convention in so far as it was suggested that there were inadequate protections for confidential journalistic material.
• That the question whether and to what extent the Security Service had complied with the requirements of the law did not provide a basis for making a declaration of incompatibility in respect of the 2016 Act; that, in any event, it had not been established that the evidence proved that the safeguards created by the 2016 Act were insufficient to prevent abuse of the powers under challenge;
• That, rather, the fact that defects had now been identified in the handling arrangements on the part of the Security Service indicated that the system was in truth capable of preventing abuse;
• And that, accordingly, a declaration of incompatibility would be refused (post, paras 354, 387-390, 399).
• Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2018] UKIPTrib IPT_15_110_CH applied.

Citation R (on the application of Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] EWA Civ 414

Topic Retention of photographs

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues N/A

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• That, although the mere taking of photographs of a person in a public place was not capable of engaging his rights under article 8(1) of the Convention, where a state authority such as the police visibly and with no obvious cause chose to take and retain photographs of an individual going about his lawful business in the street that was a sufficient intrusion by the state into the individual's privacy as to amount to a prima facie violation of his rights under article 8(1) ;
• That the taking and retention of the photographs of the claimant were in pursuance of a legitimate aim, namely “the prevention of disorder or crime”, or “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”, for the purposes of article 8(2);
• And that the question whether that interference with the claimant's rights under article 8(1) was proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued, so as to be justified as necessary in a democratic society, was a fact-sensitive question.
• Allowing the appeal (Laws LJ dissenting), that the required justification for the retention by the police of photographs of an individual had to be the more compelling where the interference with his rights was in pursuit of the protection of the community from the risk of public disorder or low level crime, as opposed to protection against the danger of terrorism or really serious criminal activity;
• That it was for the defendant to justify the interference with the claimant's article 8 rights as proportionate; that, in the circumstances, he had failed to do so; and that, accordingly, the interference with the claimant's rights was not justified under article 8(2).
• Of particular significance, Lord Collins of Mapesbury made the point that “it is plain that the last word has yet to be said on the implications for civil liberties of the taking and retention of images in the modern surveillance society.” And suggested that there is a need for “exploration of the wider, and very serious, human rights issues which arise when the State obtains and retains the images of persons who have committed no offence and are not suspected of having committed any offence.”

Citation Sutherland v HM Advocate for Scotland, [2020] UKSC 32

Topic Evidence procured by private individual passed to police – whether Article 8 violation.

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues Concerned the use of evidence procured by a paedophile hunter group that was subsequently passed to the police.

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• Held that there was no Article 8 violation as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications because the communications themselves did not fall within the scheme of values the ECHR seeks to protect and promote.

Citation Young v HM Advocate [2013] HCJAC 145

Topic Admissibility of expert evidence on case linkage analysis.

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues Appellant convicted of several charges -all but one involved violence against women. One was a murder charge.

The Moorov doctrine was applied.

Later, the appellant was contacted in relation to an investigation that was being carried out in relation to murders of six women including the appellants victim. This investigation was in part supported by case linkage analysis.

Appellant argued that this new evidence would affect the jury’s determination and that there had been a miscarriage of justice.

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• Held

1. That expert evidence might be admissible but the evidence had to be based on a recognised and developed academic discipline, following a developed methodology, and produce a result which was capable of being

2. assessed and given more or less weight in light of all the evidence.

That at this point in time case linkage analysis need not possess the necessary qualities.

Citation Z (Children) (Application for Release of DNA Profiles), Re [2015] EWCA Civ 34

Topic DNA profiles and data sharing.

UK Case Law Key Facts/Issues Concerned the question of the circumstances in which DNA profiles obtained by the police in exercise of their criminal law enforcement functions can, without the consent of the data subject, be put to uses which are remote from the field of criminal law enforcement.

Findings/Relevant Judicial Reasoning

• Held, that, whether by applying a purposive approach to statutory interpretation or by interpreting the provisions in accordance with section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in a way which was compatible with article 8 of the Convention, on a true construction section 22 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 did not permit the police to retain and use biometric material seized under section 19 for any other purpose than criminal law enforcement; that the commissioner therefore had no statutory power to retain and use the Part II sample other than for criminal law enforcement, and so could not disclose it for any other purpose; and that, accordingly, since the court could not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to require him to do something contrary to statute, the court could not order the commissioner to disclose the DNA profiles for use in care proceedings (post, paras 35– 46, 49, 50, 54).

Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557, HL(E) and S v United Kingdom (2008) 48 EHRR 1169, GC applied.

Per McFarlane and Beatson LJJ. Since the issue is confined to biometric material seized from “premises” under Part II of the 1984 Act, the court's construction of Part II , aligning it with Part V , represents an exception confined to biometric material as distinct from any other form of material which may be seized by police from premises under Part II , and has no impact on the established arrangements for disclosure of Part II material other than biometric material (post, paras 51, 53).

1 R (on the application of Miller) v College of Policing [2021] EWCA Civ 1926 at para 56.